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Abstract 
The three districts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh have the highest 
military presence in Bangladesh. Following its emergence as an independent country in 
1971, the military carried out a campaign of systematic repression of the Jumma 
indigenous people of the region. In this thesis, I focus on tourism and argue it is one of 
the ways by which ruling elites expropriate Jumma lands and circumvent indigenous land 
and cultural rights. The process is riddled with contradictions. On the one hand, violence 
against the Jumma has not ceased, and instead, the presence of the military has become 
normalized. On the other hand, the state promotes the Hills as a tourist site where tourists 
may enjoy the landscape and the ‘exotic’ inhabitants. I contextualize this conflict within 
the historical legacy of British colonialism, and the subsequent emergence of smaller 
nation-states that inherited colonial categories and institutions. 
Keywords 
Jumma, indigenous people, nation-states and nationalisms, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
militarization, tourism, Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The political economy of tourism in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts 
This thesis explores how the Bangladeshi state subjugates the indigenous Jumma 
people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (thereafter Hills) and confiscates their land through 
military-controlled tourism. I look at the normalization of militarization through low-key 
every day violence that accompanies ‘development’ through tourism. Bangladesh is an 
example of an ‘integral’ state that uses both coercion (policy and army) and the means of 
hegemonic power in civil society to harness consensus to expand on indigenous lands. 
The economic and political returns of this expansion by mainly land expropriation are 
mainly reaped by Bengali elites.  
The thesis shows that analyzing the tourist industry in the Hills reveals the 
inherently contradictory state discourses, which on the one hand attribute a pristine 
indigenous cultural distinction to the inhabitants and on the other hand, the state has been 
and continues to eradicate and repress indigenous cultural identification if and when it is 
invoked to make political or economic claims, in this case autonomous status, or simply 
the right to owning and living on their land.  From a historical perspective, this case 
shows that British colonialism left an indelible mark on Bangladesh, and set the stage for 
present-day conflicts and social schisms. In this chapter, I provide an overview of the 
Hills and its political significance in Bangladesh, followed by a discussion of why I chose 
  
2 
 
this as the area of my research, as well as the methodology I used for the research project. 
I conclude with the theorists and theoretical concepts I draw upon in my study. 
Entering the Field 
It was a public holiday on August 15, 2016 on the occasion of the 41st death 
anniversary of the “Father of the Nation” of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. My 
companion Rahnuma Ahmed, an anthropologist, and I had just arrived in Khagrachari 
district of the Hills very early that morning in an overnight bus. We had breakfast at 
Samari Chakma’s house before getting into a converted four-wheel-drive vehicle 
specifically designed to transport tourists to the hilly area of Sajek, 67 kilometers from 
Khagrachari town. Samari became the first Chakma woman in Bangladesh to get a 
license to practice law in the Supreme Court of the country in 2016. A long-time student 
activist in the Jumma people’s struggle for self-determination, she had been the president 
of the Hill Women’s Federation (HWF) for more than a decade. In 1997 when the CHT 
Accord was signed she was one of the leading figures in opposing it.  
The Accord ended the formal Jumma armed resistance movement and caused a 
split in the group between those who supported the Accord, the Parbattya Chattagram 
Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS) and those who opposed the Accord, who later organized 
and formed the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). Samari became an activist in 
the women’s organization that fell under the umbrella of the UPDF. But she and her 
fellow feminist activists soon realized that the fight for the rights of the Jumma women 
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needed to be carried out in the courtroom as much as on the streets. Her frustration with 
the slow and biased legal system prompted her to become a practicing lawyer at the age 
of thirty-seven. 
The ‘chander gari’ (moon vehicle) that was scheduled to take us to Sajek was 
waiting outside Samari’s house in Mahajanpara at nine in the morning. The schools were 
off for the day but the children did not really have the day off. They were all required to 
march through the small town of Khagrachari to pay respect to the country’s ‘founding 
father’ (Sheikh Mujibur Rahman) and first president of the independent country. He was 
also the father of the present prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, who had inherited the party 
leadership of Awami League (AL) after his death. In 1975 a military coup had 
assassinated almost all the members of the extended Sheikh family. Sheikh Hasina and 
her sister Sheikh Rehana had survived the attack as they were not in the country at the 
time. 
Sheikh Mujib had a major role in leading the movement for self-determination of 
the Bengali people in the post-Partition period. In the then East Pakistan he was the 
revolutionary leader who refused to bow down to West Pakistan’s political and economic 
marginalization of its eastern part. Between one to three million mostly Bengalis were 
killed by the Pakistan army during the war of 1971. Whereas Pakistan was supported by 
the United States, East Pakistan received support from India and Russia. West Pakistan 
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was forced to withdraw its troops after nine months of war and consequently Bangladesh 
became an independent nation-state.  
However, Sheikh Mujib lost his popularity among indigenous peoples when he 
refused to recognize the people of the Hills, calling upon the Jummas to assimilate and 
‘become Bengali’ (Mohsin 2000). His policies played a considerable role in fueling the 
Jumma people’s armed movement for self-determination. The commemoration of Mujib 
as the ‘father of the nation’ in Khagrachari and other parts of the Hills hence carries a 
menacing message for the Jummas. 
The chander gari trip to Sajek took us approximately three hours. At the Shapla 
Chottor (central part of Khagrachari) we were stuck in a traffic jam for about 20 minutes. 
Most of the walls in the town were plastered with ‘Shok Dibosh’ (National Day of 
mourning) posters. The design of the posters did not vary much - Sheikh Mujib’s bust-
size photo featured in all of them with the splatter of blood for a dramatic appearance. 
Most of the processions were by school children with loudspeakers blaring what sounded 
like Mujib’s famous 7th March speech declaring non-cooperation with the West Pakistan 
government. The Shapla Chottor stage was set for the programme. Just beyond the busy 
town center the hills were very steep and daunting at times. However, our driver Mintu 
Chakma knew exactly when to speed up and slow down and made the driving look like 
cakewalk. His two companions Bablu and Jelen provided occasional instructions. 
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On our way to Sajek we passed through Boalkhali Union, the Maini River and 
Dighinala Cantonment which is one of the largest and one of the six army cantonments 
under the 24th Infantry Division of the Bangladesh Military in the Hills, established in the 
1970s. Although Sajek Valley is situated in Sajek Union in Baghaichhari Upazila that 
falls within the Rangamati District, there are no roads linking Sajek directly with 
Rangamati town and the fastest land route to the area is through Khagrachhari. 
All tourists therefore have to enter Khagrachari town first, exit it through 
Dighinala and re-enter Rangamati through Baghaichhari - having to pass through two 
entry and one exit checkpoints. Baghaichhari is the village home of Kalpana Chakma. 
Kalpana was a fiery activist who was abducted by the military in 1996, a day before the 
countrywide general elections where she was campaigning for the local Jumma candidate 
Bijoy Ketan Chakma. She still remains missing and despite numerous investigations and 
much evidence about the day from her brothers who were eye-witnesses to the abduction, 
the state has failed to bring justice. On the way there we noticed a signpost pointing to 
Marisya, Kalpana’s home. At Baghaihat all vehicles and passengers had to be registered 
at a military checkpoint before entering. Finally, after nearly three hours of driving we 
reached Ruilui Para in Sajek. 
In 2007-8 the country went through a two-year state of emergency with a 
suspension of all normal constitutional procedures which was declared by the military 
following violence between the two main political parties, the Bangladesh Awami 
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League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In April of 2008 about 70 
homes belonging to Jumma people were burned down in several villages of Sajek, about 
an hour’s drive from Ruilui Para. The attack received a lot of national media attention 
and condemnations by human rights activists who visited the area demanding an 
independent investigation to bring the perpetrators to justice. The situation in Sajek 
continued to remain volatile and in February 2010 there was yet another attack in the 
same area and this time 400 homes, of mostly the Jummas, were burned down. Several 
eye-witnesses said that members of the security forces were present when the attacks 
took place. Two Jumma villagers were shot and killed by military officers. With the 
military taking over the road construction work in Sajek (leading up to the border of India 
in Mizoram) it seemed that Sajek was being prepared for something. Exacerbating the 
violence in the area, Sajek, and many other parts of the Hills are regularly affected by 
acute food shortages, the latest one hitting the area in April 2017 and affecting more than 
500 families there. Thus, Sajek represents the paradox of becoming a tourist site, yet is 
one of poorest and most policed and violent areas of the country. The paradox, however, 
is explained when one realizes that the state controls and manages both the tourist 
industry and the violence.  
Since 2013 Sajek has become one of the most popular destinations for young, 
Bengali middle-class tourists from the cities. There are many attractive aspects to Sajek, 
some of which are promoted in advertising brochures: it is regarded as an adventure for 
young tourists, it is physically remote and hilly, it is close to the Indian border, and it is 
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inhabited by Jumma indigenous people with their distinctive cultural life. In a manner of 
speaking, it is promoted as a ‘safe’ adventure, because the state provides full protection to 
tourists, evidenced by the presence of the military and police, along with several military 
checkpoints. In fact, the Chittagong Hill Tracts is the only fully militarized area in 
Bangladesh, and despite a formal Accord signed between the Jumma people and the 
Government of Bangladesh in 1997, the area has an overwhelming presence of security 
forces. Moreover, ethnic tension between the Jummas and Bengali settler groups is 
pervasive, violence against Jumma women continues with impunity, and cracks and 
fissures continue to widen between indigenous political groups themselves. Within such a 
setting however, the Bangladesh military has been consolidating its presence in the Hills 
through its corporate interest in tourism, which has become the façade to expropriate 
indigenous land.  
A primer on the term ‘Jumma’ as used in the thesis 
Throughout the thesis I use the term ‘Jumma’, which literally means ‘those who 
do jhum or swidden cultivation’. It is used as a collective term to refer to at least 11 
different indigenous groups that have inhabited the Hills for generations including the 
Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Chak, Pankhoya, Mro, Bawm, Lushai, Khyang, 
and Khumi.  There are other terms used to refer to the indigenous peoples of the Hills 
including ‘Pahari’ (a Bengali word meaning ‘hill people’ and not accepted by many), 
‘Upajati’ (used in the CHT Accord it literally means ‘sub-national’ and is considered 
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derogatory) and ‘Nri-goshthi’ (used in government documents meaning ‘anthropological 
people’ and not considered an acceptable term). The term ‘adibashi’ or ‘indigenous’ is 
also rejected by some groups, the former being a Bengali word and the latter according to 
some is an identifier of neo-liberalism as it is a popular term used by the United Nations.  
The term ‘Jumma’ was used initially by Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati 
Samity (PCJSS) as a signifier for the collective struggle for self-determination against the 
state. Historian Willem van Schendel indicated in his research that the term ‘Jumma’ was 
used as a mark of deﬁance and a protest against attempts at forced assimilation into 
Bengali culture and as a way ‘to cope with the political and economic consequences of 
loss of power, growing expendability to the state and cultural marginalization’ (Schendel 
1992). However, there is also critique of this term. According to Mohsin (2000), the term 
was used pejoratively by Bengalis to denote the people as primitive and backward 
farmers. She also found that Marmas and Tripuras did not accept this term because it was 
a Chakma word and reinforced Chakma hegemony especially because the PCJSS was 
strongly dominated by Chakma, and the Chakmas were also the largest ‘minority’ in the 
Hills. Therefore, I acknowledge in my thesis that there is no common consensus over a 
general acceptable term and any common term used to describe different indigenous 
groups has the tendency to essentialize. All the various terms used by different groups 
could be said to be a form of strategic essentialism (Spivak 1987), a form of essentialism 
used for strategic advocacy and resistance. 
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Tourism as Erasure and Establishment of a Nationalist Narrative 
By 2014 the military had set up two luxury resorts on Ruilui Para, Sajek, about 35 
kilometers from the villages where homes had been burnt down. The military had labeled 
Sajek the ‘Switzerland of Bangladesh’. Someone in the media mentioned that it was 
‘more beautiful than the Darjeeling’ of India. Sajek has now become one of the most 
popular tourist destinations in Bangladesh. Unsurprisingly, on the military website that 
promotes Sajek’s tourism, there is no mention of either the recent history of violence in 
Sajek, or the history of massacres carried out by the military in the Hills. The history 
section is sanitized to erase the Jumma people’s struggle for self-determination. There are 
many examples of such erasure in other parts of the world where original inhabitants 
have been evicted from their homeland to accommodate powerful state-backed settlers. 
For example, there are many parallels to this situation in Canada, such as the Oka 
Resistance where the Mohawks First Nations resisted the Canadian government’s 
encroachment on their land in 1990 in Oka, Quebec. Similarly, the erasure of the 
Palestinian Nakba (Catastrophe) when the Palestinians were ethnically cleansed in 1948 
has been consistently absented from public and dominant histories, a topic that a number 
of scholars have been trying to bring attention to, such as Sa’di and Abu Lughod (2007). 
According to the editors, in the Western public domain, the dominant narrative is of 
Israel’s creation based on biblical origins, which overshadows the violence carried out 
against the Palestinians in 1948 when they were ethnically cleansed from their ancestral 
lands. In this narrative, Palestinians are portrayed as refugees with no history. In their 
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work the scholars point out, “memory is one of the few weapons available to those 
against whom the tide of history has turned. It contributes to a counter-history” (p. 6). In 
the Palestinian case, like that of the Jumma, the wound remains open: the Nakba of 1948 
did not end, but Israeli violence, and colonial expansion on the Palestinian land continues 
to this day (Sa’di and Abu Lughod 2007). In his work on social memory, Connerton 
(1989) observes that if the memory of past injustices live on, and those injustices have 
shaped the structure of a society’s present, then it is very important to take efforts to 
rectify them. The state-led violence that continued for over two decades in the Hills has 
never been addressed or even acknowledged. However, the Jumma people remember the 
everyday horror of that period, the memory lives on, at a time when state violence 
continues. 
The Jummas of the Hills have a long history of resistance that dates back to 
colonial times. They have resisted economic exploitation by the British authorities, and 
their marginalization by Pakistan and the present-day Bangladeshi governments. The 
Bangladeshi state’s response to Jumma resistance has been overwhelmingly repressive 
and often violent. The Jumma and other indigenous groups have been subjected to 
surveillance, massacres, torture, and rape, as well as land-grabbing by government 
officials and private corporations. The CHT Accord signed in 1997 was intended to 
resolve the conflict. However, it failed to settle the land disputes between Jummas on the 
one hand, and the state, Bengali settlers, private corporations and the Bengali elite on the 
other. Instead, since then the Hills have become open to corporate interests and for land 
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expansion, and caused a fracture between the Jumma political leaders. In addition, 
following the Accord the ethnic divide between the Bengalis and the Jumma has 
continued to grow. Within this backdrop tourism has become a new tool to obfuscate and 
violate Jumma rights, normalize surveillance and militarization, and establish a neoliberal 
strategy to give an appearance of peace while advancing the interests of ruling elites. 
The study looks at the broader effects of tourism and its complicity with state 
power, which operates on a two-pronged policy. On the one hand, the tourist industry has 
been used to alienate and dispossess Jumma from their traditional land, and enforcing 
Bengali majoritarian politics; on the other hand, it treats the Jumma and their cultural 
practices as exotic and profitable products for tourist consumption. Hooks (2009) argues 
that when race and ethnicity become commodified as resources for pleasure, “the culture 
of specific groups, as well as the bodies of individuals can be seen as constituting an 
alternative playground where members of dominating races, genders, sexual practices 
affirm their power-over in intimate relations with the Other” (p.367). 
Similarly, in his work on tourism, Hall (2007) emphasized the importance of 
looking at power and politics implicated in tourism, especially ‘ethnic tourism’. He 
asserted that tourism never happens in a vacuum, and in terms of tourism in indigenous 
people’s areas, it is very political and related to power. This implies prioritizing 
commodification and representation of heritage and identity when an area is promoted for 
tourists. In this process, various individuals, interest groups, political parties, private 
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corporations, and the government’s tourism board are involved in these decisions, 
underscoring how the struggle for power and control is at the core of tourism 
development. This entwining of state power and tourism is clear in the case of the Hills in 
Bangladesh, where the military-industrial institutions and the political elite are heavily 
invested in tourism. 
However, before analyzing the present situation, it is necessary to provide a brief 
historical background on the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign post-colonial 
nation-state and its strategies to maintain hegemonic power. It is also important to have a 
deeper knowledge of its relationship to indigenous people, the process of minoritization, 
and a broader understanding of tourism and particularly ‘touristic ethnicity’ as defined by 
Robert E. Wood, and its ramifications (Wood 1998). 
Bangladesh is a small country in South Asia with an area of 147,570 square-
kilometers. With a population of 169 million people (2011 census), it is the 10th most 
densely-populated country in the world. Bengalis make up nearly 98 percent of the 
population. The rest are mostly indigenous peoples who live in the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts, with a smaller number spread across the other 61 districts of the country, as well 
as Urdu-speaking populations. 
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Topographical Background of the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts is located in the southeastern corner of the country 
under the Chittagong Division, which is one of the eight administrative divisions of 
Bangladesh. The Hills consist of three districts: Khagrachari, Bandarban and Rangamati. 
Khagrachari shares borders with the Indian state of Tripura on the North and West, 
Rangamati shares its borders with the Indian Mizoram on the East, and Bandarban shares 
its border with Myanmar on the South and South-East. The first known migration to the 
lands started in the 1400s when communities known as the Kukis arrived there from 
Myanmar (Chowdhury 2016). Under the Mughal Empire, since the 1660s, this frontier 
region between the Lushai Hills, Tripura and Arakan, was referred to as Kapas Mahal 
(region of cotton). It was in 1860 that the 13,295 square-kilometre area consisting of 
forests, hills and lake, was named the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the British when they 
incorporated it under the colonial state. The Jumma people in the Hills consist of the 
Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Tanchangya, Mro, Bawm, Pankhoya, Lushai, Khumi, Khyang, 
and Chak. The Chakmas are the largest community of Jummas. However, since the 1970s 
Bengalis make up at least 50 percent of those living in the Hills. 
Throughout the two and a half decades of armed rebellion the military burned the 
homes of the Jummas, carried out mass killings and rape of Jumma women and as a 
strategy, placed Bengali settlers as ‘human shields’ (IWGIA, 2012) on the land of the 
Jummas near the military camps. This has exacerbated violence, whereby Bengali settlers 
  
14 
 
attack the Jumma with impunity, which is condoned by the state. The state itself also 
continues to intimidate the Jummas through the security forces in the Hills, and by 
fueling violence between Bengalis and Jummas, and between the two main Jumma 
political groups. In recent times, the news that dominates the Hills has mostly been about 
the violence in the area, what the media likes to label as ‘Pahari-Bengali ethnic conflict’. 
The Bangladesh government announced 2016 as Tourism Year and through the 
Bangladesh Tourism Board (BTB) and Bangladesh Parjatan Corporation (BPC), they 
planned to promote tourism by organizing year-round events until 2018. In general, 
tourism is seen as an industry that leads to economic development, especially in poor 
countries. Thus, most of the research done on tourism in Bangladesh itself and tourism in 
particular, focused on the economic aspect. Eco-tourism has received a great deal of 
attention since the 1990s. There is a popular perception that eco-tourism is 
environmentally sustainable, while concurrently providing tourists with a special 
experience when visiting an ‘authentic’ indigenous people and region. However, the 
development of tourism in the Hills is being executed without the involvement of the 
Jummas.  
According to Jumma advocacy organizations, at least 1700 acres of land have 
been allocated to build tourist resorts (including by the military and private corporations), 
which resulted in the eviction of at least 700 Jumma families from 26 villages (Chakma 
and Chakma 2015). In 2015, the government planned to acquire nearly 700 acres of land 
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in Alutila, Khagrachari (70km from Sajek where I conducted my ethnographic fieldwork 
this year) which would evict 300 Jumma families from their homes. The project has 
recently been put on hold after protests by local Jummas and activists. Another example 
of how tourism has negatively affected indigenous populations is the military resort in 
Nilgiri in the Bandarban hill district which led to the eviction of 200 Mro and Marma 
families from six villages in the area. 
The increased presence of Bengali tourists helps to normalize the militarization of 
the region and grant it a non-threatening appearance, something that I observed during 
my fieldwork this year. Underpinning this state-sponsored tourism is a paradox and 
contradiction:  on the one hand, the state aims to promote tourism, on the other hand, the 
military and the local administration order the restriction of communication between 
Bengalis and Jummas. In 2012 the district administration in an official notice declared 
that Bengalis and foreigners from outside the Hills would be barred from speaking to 
Jummas without the presence of government officials - obviously there is an anxiety that 
tourists speaking freely to Jumma might hear stories about land confiscation and 
discrimination. 
Methodology, Self-Reflection and Doing Politically Committed Research  
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1995) through her years of ethnographic research in 
violent and politically volatile spaces argued that to conduct studies in such spaces one 
cannot entirely distance herself from her research subject and is thus ethically obliged to 
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take a “politically committed and morally engaged” stand. In the case of my research, my 
first encounter with the situation in the Hills was as a journalist, transitioning to a 
position as an activist, and finally a researcher. In a situation where a community of 
people is minoritized and subjugated by the post-colonial state and faced with a history of 
land loss through the acts of a powerful armed military under the guise of Bengali 
nationalism, this position is even more important. In situations where there is war, 
conflict or exercise of power to subjugate human lives Scheper-Hughes’ views are 
critical, and contradict the idea of the traditional role of the anthropologist as neutral, 
dispassionate, and objective. Speed (2008) also takes a similar stand to advocate for the 
“transformation” of the discipline. Such an approach engages informants as 
“collaborators” instead of “subjects”, but it also means that the work should be of 
relevance to a broader audience, rather than published research that is meant to take up 
space in one corner of a library. 
As a member of the Bengali majority community I have opposed the use of power 
of majoritarian politics to reduce Jummas to minoritized citizens of the country. Having 
worked as an activist in the Hills, I have developed good working relations and 
friendships with Jumma activists from different political groups, civil society 
organizations, women rights groups and community leaders. Although my Bengali 
identity makes me an ‘outsider’ in this struggle, my work as an activist has made me an 
‘insider’. Hence my position as a researcher is one that Annie (2014) calls “not fixed but 
multiple and shifting” (p. 59). Annie, like me, having previously worked with protest 
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leaders for three years as a journalist and activist at a coal mine project in Bangladesh, 
maintains that it is indeed possible for an anthropologist to be an ‘insider’ and keep one’s 
distance. Ingold (2017) argues that it is important in anthropology to “study with people” 
(p. 21) as opposed to making studies on them. Somewhat along the same vein Smith 
(2017) emphasizes the importance of ‘unlearning’ in order for a researcher to position 
herself as an ally “in the hope that my work can help prompt unlearning in a field full of 
settlers” (p. 211). 
The first time I visited Sajek in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh was in 
February 2010. I was working as the coordinator of the International Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Commission, an advocacy group when we received calls about tensions in the 
area. The Bangladesh military had been building a road through the area that would meet 
at the borders of India in Mizoram and had been bringing in Bengali workers from 
outside to build the road. They were not only building the road but were also occupying 
land and consolidating their share over the local bazaar. The conflicts over land and 
bazaar share sparked off this attack.  
When we started receiving calls we decided to take a group of journalists and 
lawyers to assess the situation. On 19-20 February, two days after our four-person 
delegation came back to Dhaka, the capital city, before we could finish writing up our 
analysis, we were informed that nearly 400 homes of Jumma families in Sajek and 
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Khagrachari had been burnt down by Bengali settlers, and two Jumma villagers had been 
shot dead by military officers. 
Six years later when I went to visit Sajek as part of my MA fieldwork in summer 
of 2016, it had a completely different look. The Ruilui para village that is a long stretch 
of road about 1km is the location for this new army-supported tourism project. The two 
main military resorts were located on both ends of the road and in between there were 
about 50 one-story and two-story buildings which were bed and breakfasts owned mostly 
by Tripura inhabitants of the area. The tourists we came across were mostly young 
Bengali professionals at the early stage of their career and accommodation cost between 
Tk. 1500 ($24 CAD) and Tk. 3000 ($48 CAD) per night.  
One has to cross military checkpoints at both Khagrachari and Rangamati districts 
before entering Ruilui Para. Military vehicles escort tourist cars twice daily from 
Baghaichari (Rangamati) to Ruilui Para; all tourists must register their names and travel 
itinerary at the military checkpoint in Baghaichari prior to the escorted journey. 
Between June and September 2016, I spent three months in Bangladesh to 
conduct fieldwork for this research. During this time, I carried out 20 semi-structured 
interviews with Jumma activists, development workers, scholars who have done research 
on land-grabbing, Jumma lawyers, women’s rights activists, and others involved with 
Jumma political parties. All those I interviewed were previously known to me. For my 
data collection in the two hill districts of Khagrachari and Rangamati I conducted 
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participant observation, and in-depth and informal interviews. In some ways I have been 
conducting participant observation, especially those related to military surveillance, from 
my days working as a journalist and activist in the area, which was helpful in that I 
already had a good basis for my research, even though this time my participant-
observation had an academic focus.  
My work as the former coordinator of CHT Commission turned out to be a 
double-edged sword. The familiarity of the field and the local people made it relatively 
easy to conduct the interviews without raising any concerns; however, my visit to the 
field itself was difficult. Since 2011 the government took a hard line against journalists 
and activists who advocated for rights of the Jummas following criticism of the military’s 
human rights violations at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII). 
That year, the CHT Commission had to curtail its fact-finding visit to the CHT following 
disruptions by intelligence agencies during our meetings there.  
I had visited many parts of the CHT between 2009 and 2014 while working as the 
coordinator of the CHT Commission. During that time, I collected considerable 
information and field notes. Conversations, observations and exchanges with activist 
colleagues and informants, have shaped my thinking about the issues in this thesis. 
Hence, I would say that the fieldwork for this work is not limited to the three months of 
work that I did during my MA but builds on the experiences and knowledge I acquired 
from 2009. 
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I conducted interviews in Khagrachari, Rangamati, Chittagong and Dhaka all 
depending on the convenience of my respondents. I deliberately avoided going to 
Bandarban, where intelligence agents are known to be most active in their surveillance of 
activists and journalists. In 2011 a British development worker, who was married to a 
local Khyang woman, was expelled from Bangladesh for participating in a local activists’ 
rally in Bandarban. My inability to go to Bandarban is a setback for my work as state-led 
tourism first began in Bandarban which is the most picturesque of the three districts and 
some of the poorest Jumma people live in this area. It was also because of this I asked 
two of my respondents to come to Chittagong to speak to me. Both of them worked on 
land-grabbing by state forces in Bandarban. Ranglai Mro (one of the two respondents) 
was brutally tortured by the military in 2008 for putting up a resistance on behalf of the 
Mro people of Sualok Union, where he was headman at the time. 
The day I arrived in Bangladesh, I went over to the CHT Commission office to 
meet my former colleagues. June 12 was coming up in the calendar and this would be the 
20th anniversary of the disappearance of Kalpana Chakma, a young, indigenous woman 
activist who left some powerful words in her diary which were later published by Hill 
Women’s Federation. My colleague at the CHT Commission secretariat, gave me further 
updates about a meeting for the Commission members with the outgoing National Human 
Rights Commission Chairperson. They had scheduled it for 10 June and asked me 
whether I was interested in being present at the meeting. I agreed and said I would take 
notes for the meeting.  
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I also took part in several civil society-led movements. On June 30, on the 
occasion of the 161st anniversary of the Santal Revolution (against the British) a civil 
society group organized a discussion. On August 9, I attended the programs organized for 
the UN International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples. On August 10, I attended a 
seminar organized by the Association for Land Reform and Development (ALRD), a 
Non-Government Organization (NGO) on land rights and prevention of terrorism. 
Terrorism was of course a new addition to banners of both NGOs and political groups. 
Three weeks after I arrived in Bangladesh a brutal attack took place by members of ISIS 
in a restaurant in Dhaka City on July 1. It was the first such an attack in Bangladesh. The 
security situation in the country changed overnight following that attack.  
While I was there I also went to see an exhibition on the CHT at the DRIK 
gallery. All the photos showcased the Hills as a tourist destination with beautiful 
landscapes and exotic, indigenous people. On the 20th anniversary of the disappearance 
of Kalpana Chakma there were a number of events organized by various groups in Dhaka 
and Chittagong. I attended two related events in Dhaka - one organized by Hill Women's 
Federation and another organized by a civil society group.  
In the meantime, the Bangladesh Border Guards prevented Jummas from taking 
part in a local union council election causing a ruling party leader to get elected. This 
caused a lot of tension in the Hills while I was there. There were some attacks on Jumma 
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neighborhoods as a result of that. A number of strikes were called by the Jumma activists 
which had an impact on my travel as well. 
Geros (2008) draws upon her ethnographic work to explore how the spread of fear 
disseminated by the political structures affects not only the ways that social groups and 
individuals experience and coped with the situation but also how such conditions affected 
and constrained her own field research. It’s very important to acknowledge and discuss 
these constraints at the outsets as it has implications for the outcome of the research and 
also to understand the limitations of the research. In my case while my past work 
experience led me to gain an understanding of the issue itself and gave me familiarity 
with the area and the people, my work as an activist in the area imposed limitations on 
my field research, especially in how much I could speak to the inhabitants or ordinary 
people without getting anyone into trouble. The areas I visited are heavily monitored by 
the security forces, especially those areas that are the subject of my research. In fact, I 
was told by the local leaders there that I should not spend too much time in the Hills and 
should only make short visits. Thus, I failed to talk to Jumma villagers to find out about 
the consequences of military-based tourism on their everyday lives and to better 
understand how they view and interpret the transformations resulting from tourism and 
the effects of the violence. As a result, my interviews were limited to activists and other 
researchers who have an understanding of the issue through their work, and as mentioned 
earlier I drew on my own experiences as well.  
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During my fieldwork, the Bangladesh Border Guards prevented Jummas from 
taking part in a local union council election causing a ruling party leader to get elected. 
This caused a lot of tension in the Hills while I was there. There were some attacks on 
Jumma neighborhoods as a result of that. A number of strikes were called by the Jumma 
activists which had an impact on my travel as well. The hartals also made it difficult to do 
fieldwork. Although the main obstacle to do my fieldwork was my own previous identity 
as coordinator of the CHT Commission, it would be equally dangerous for me to openly 
do research on state violence on indigenous people. Research on violence on indigenous 
people is strongly discouraged. 
Research Questions 
The study inquires into the steady and expanding incursion of the Bangladeshi state in 
the Hills through tourism. More specifically, my research examines the implications of 
military-controlled tourism on the power dynamics between the state and the Jummas, 
Bengali hegemony and the paradox of tourism in a conflict area. It focuses on the 
following areas:  
▪ What does the involvement of the state in tourism imply for its national project 
and what does it tell us about how state power is enacted and reproduced through 
tourism? 
▪ How does the state use tourism to control the indigenous population? To what 
extent is the public aware of the military's economic interests in tourism? To what 
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extent and how have these interests changed state strategies in dominating the 
region? 
▪ What role does tourism play in reinforcing administrative, social and political 
hierarchies? 
▪ How does the state manage the paradox of presenting indigenous peoples as a 
distinctive population worthy of a tourist gaze, while simultaneously denying 
them recognition in the constitution? 
▪ How does the state justify the presence of the military in the field of tourism? 
What do the current dynamics in the CHT between the various actors indicate on 
a wider national scale? 
Theoretical Framework and Concepts 
Central to the argument of my thesis is the asymmetrical relations of power 
between Bengali tourists and the Jumma destination residents, and how this power is 
attained and enacted. My academic approach to power, and in particular relevant sections 
that discuss colonial forms of knowledge and the power to represent draws on theorists of 
power and post-colonial scholars. In the following sub-sections, I discuss concepts of 
power and representation and how it applies to this case, mainly how the majority 
Bengali exercises power over the Jummas. In addition, I discuss nationalism as an 
imagined community, mobilized to exercise a majoritarian hegemony, violence, and fear 
mongering.  I discuss how leading scholars conceptualized the process of minoritization 
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in post-colonial states in the South Asian context, and the political economy of tourism 
and land expropriation  
Power and representation.  
Edward Said, the well-known literary critic observes that the historical experience 
of those subjected to imperial rule entailed subservience and exclusion, and nationalist 
resistance and decolonization aimed for liberation and inclusion. However, much of the 
subsequent failings in the development of nationalism was “the direct result of either 
forgetting or rejecting this edifying equation” (Said 2000: xxviii). 
Indeed, many of the problems that afflict the countries that became nominally 
independent from colonial powers may be attributed to the fact that they inherited 
colonial institutions, political and social categories and classifications, and in turn 
marginalized and oppressed other groups. Mamdani (2014) argues that the process of 
state formation generates political identities that are distinct not only from market-based 
identities but also from cultural identities. 
Both Said (1979) and Stuart Hall (1997) were particularly interested in the power 
of representation, meaning how dominant groups represent the ‘Other’. For Said, the 
construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ in Orientalist literature became the working assumption 
and where the ‘West’ and ‘East’ never meet as they are regarded as inherently 
oppositional and unequal. The power to write about and speak about the ‘Other’ is clear 
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in Bangladesh, and where the official national discourse has pervasive presence in public 
space, especially through the mainstream media, although there are alternative and 
oppositional sources that came about with social media. In the national discourse, and 
more so in tourist brochures and advertisements, the Jumma are regarded as visible 
cultural artefacts that fit appropriately with the pristine landscape.  
Thus, the officials promoting tourism in the Hills promote the idea of the 
unchanging native to lure tourists to gaze at the Jumma and other indigenous populations 
as if they were on exhibition. Yet, they become immediately invisible politically, and the 
suffering and ongoing struggle over land is all but completely absent and inaudible to 
tourists. This is comparable to many similar processes in North America, Australia, and 
on this particular topic, Mawani’s (2007) work on Vancouver Park is particularly 
interesting.  She argues that while state power has been used to colonize the northern 
landscape, national narratives of legality and liberty are “deeply and problematically 
rooted in ideas of a northern and empty wilderness” (p. 717). 
In trying to understand the asymmetry between the state and the Jummas as it is 
played out in the spatial politics in the Hills, it is important to analyze power within what 
Foucault (2007) states is “the concrete and historical framework of its operation”. The 
threatening power of the state is tangible in the Hills through the uniformed and armed 
presence of the military. Foucault observed that power must be understood in “the 
strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
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embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social 
hegemonies” (Foucault 2007). Disciplinary power, along with his idea of 
governmentality, help to understand how the state uses power as a political strategy to 
control a group of people. Disciplinary power is propagated through institutions and 
establishments such as the military institution. Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
also addresses those activities of government which include a methodical approach to 
shaping a population’s behavior according to particular sets of norms to gain a certain 
outcome. Anderson (1983) and Mamdani (2014) in explaining nationalism and collective 
identity/memory writes on the processes of reproducing imagined communities. 
Ultimately, the ruling elites in Bangladesh exploit Jummas, Bengali settlers who are 
largely from poorer segments of society, as well as tourist groups in order to justify 
dispossessing the Jummas from their land. 
Said’s (1979) Orientalism was a critique of the assumptions that underpin 
Western knowledge production, and the power of representation Orientalists have 
wherein ‘we’ represents the West or the powerful subject of history, and the ‘other’ the 
inferior object of history, assumed to be passive and unchanging. In a general sense, this 
applies to how official and dominant national discourses may reproduce an internal 
‘other’. In the case of the Hills the patronizing Bengali attitude towards Jumma 
indigenous cultures is based on this distinction between ‘us’ Bengalis and ‘them’ the 
internal others. Stereotyping Jummas as exotic, enigmatic and curious in terms of their 
clothes, food habits, language and facial features makes it easy for Bengalis to see 
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themselves as morally superior. This then justifies turning Jummas into an object for the 
tourist gaze and this assumed superiority and constant ‘othering’ of the Jummas helps to 
mobilize consent to keep Jummas under surveillance, to criminalize them, and thus gives 
the state the moral authority to take over their land without compensation and with little 
opposition from the Bengali population. 
Hall (1997) argues that representation of the ‘different’ and the ‘Other’ is a form 
of patronization and often hides a fascination in this ‘Otherness’. In popular culture, 
representation of ‘Others’ deemed inferior fosters stereotyping and creates a spectacle of 
the ‘Other’. The Jumma ‘spectacle’, however, erases the history of state oppression, 
violence, land loss and the absence of rights. On the one hand, the state supports the 
celebration of cultural festivals, beauty contests, food festivals, promotion of ethnic 
tourism – all sponsored by corporations, the military and the state tourism board. On the 
other hand, the Hills to this day remains the place where criminal government officers are 
posted as punishment. Even newspapers lose their commercial revenue for identifying 
them as ‘adibashi’ instead of ‘terrorists’. In addition to a discourse and publicly 
orchestrated spectacle that endeavors to erases years of state-led oppression and 
massacres in the Hills, the state also attempts to hide present-day oppression and 
normalizes it for elite Bengalis who accept militarization and surveillance as an 
acceptable part of keeping law and order. Both Hall (1997) and Fanon (2008) talks about 
white obsession with sexuality of black people. This may also apply to disempowered 
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and minoritized populations, especially where the physical appearance is significantly 
different from that of the majority. 
Nationalism, majoritarian hegemony, violence, fear and the state.  
In this thesis, I also draw on Antonio Gramsci’s works, where he proposes that 
state power weakens if it cannot mobilize popular support. Therefore, its hegemonic 
power has to be reproduced shaping beliefs and attitudes that permeate everyday life in a 
way that supports the structures of power. Hegemonic ideologies in time are internalized, 
and become common sense among large segments of the population, they appear as 
‘natural’.  This is relevant to how the state reproduced a Bengali-Muslim identity as the 
national core, which by definition excludes others that are neither Bengali nor Muslims, 
or belong to one ut not the other.  This demonization of the ‘others’ justifies surveillance 
of the Jummas which it considers as threats to national stability, and as a suspect group 
that is not entirely loyal to the nation-state. This attitude and repression of the Jumma led 
to their marginalization. Gramsci’s work explains how the state through institutions in 
civil society, such as educational and religious institutions help reproduce state ideology 
and hegemony in a non-coercive manner, however, it also relies on coercive institutions, 
the police and, military to impose its power violently and directly. His arguments about 
how the ruling class exerts power over society is clearly evident in the case of the 
Jumma, who are rendered exotic populations to be admired for the ‘primitive’ ways, but 
also controlled violently if necessary for their resistance and assertion of land rights; in 
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state propaganda, Jumma resistance is represented as a threat to state sovereignty and 
national unity. 
Chakma (2010a, 2010b), Mohsin (1997) and Adnan and Dastidar (2010) writes 
about various aspects of violence in the CHT and Bengali nationalism, the topics vary 
and include: land grabbing mechanisms and the interest groups involved, forced 
displacement, violence against indigenous women, structural limitations on access to 
justice, and state marginalization and post-colonial nation-state building. I build on the 
existing body of this literature in order to inquire into the present-day paradox involved in 
state-sponsored tourism and how this rearranges administrative, social and political 
hierarchies, and the violence involved in such tourism. 
Anthropologist Prashanta Tripura who grew up in Khagrachari in the Hills, 
analyzes how the state defines Bangladesh as a homogenous Bengali nation with one 
Bangla national culture (Tripura 2015). He points out that this ethnic and linguistic 
hegemony is a colonialist notion inherited by the country’s Bengali elite. He shows how 
'ethnicity' is politicized and socially constructed by dominant classes, to establish Bengali 
ethnic hegemony leading to exclusionary politics. In a similar vein, Yasmin (2014) also 
provides a critical study on cultural hegemony and the construction of the Bengali 
national identity based on “positional dominance” (p. 129). Yasmin refers to the tyranny 
of the majority as a “flawed conception” (p. 117) of post-colonial nationhood. As 
Schendel (2001) observed, the issue of national identity is one of the most important and 
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contested debates in the public domain since 1971 and notes that the term “Jumma” was 
coined as a unifier to emphasize the “non-Bengaliness” and cultural separateness, and 
shared history of marginalization and repression by the state. Like Schendel, Mohsin 
(1997) too places liability of the disenfranchisement of the Jummas on the Bengali 
political elite who sought to conceive the idea of the nation-state as based on the 
understanding of homogeneous nationhood. 
The imagined community, othering and political economy of tourism and 
land expropriation.  
According to Anderson (1983), nationalism is built on the idea of the “imagined 
community” which he describes as a group of people who feel an affinity towards each 
other despite being strangers. The commonness and affinity comes simply from being 
born in the same geographical area defined under a ‘nation’. The implications of this 
affinity in my research lies not in the cohesiveness of the community but the exclusion 
created through this cohesiveness, in this case the Jummas who despite being part of the 
Bangladeshi nation still are not part of the imagined Bengali community. In writing about 
hegemonic nationalism Schendel (2001) points out that Bangladesh, like many other 
post-colonial countries, fought against cultural pluralism by military rather than political 
means which he points out is a continuation of the earlier colonial attempts at 
homogenizing the population.   
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Other scholars wrote critically about tourism and the tourist encounters, which is 
useful to the Hills where tourism has been recently promoted and expanded. Salazar 
(2017) for example, argues that although in popular perception, tourists are portrayed as 
harmless and light-hearted figures and visitors, however, the systematic inequality 
created through tourism erases the violence and power that are inherently present in 
touristic encounters. On this particular topic, Salazar states: “The sheer force of enacted 
tourism imaginaries can quickly dispossess people of their history, identity and culture” 
(p. 705). Similarly, McLeod (2010) analyzes the struggle for control over different types 
of natural resources and its relationship to power politics in tourism. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, unresolved land issues have been a source of much of the conflict 
between Bengalis and the Jummas, a state-constructed ‘ethnic conflict’. Paradoxically, 
the state denies Jumma people the right to their ethnic identity, it nonetheless highlights 
their cultural identity to develop tourism with a focus on their ethnic identity. As Holmes 
(2010) suggests in the context of Belize, celebrating diversity in the tourist field and 
denying it through the promotion of a singular national identity indicates the presence of 
“unresolved tensions”. 
Macleod and Carrier (2010) specifically discusses unequal power in interactions 
between tourists and indigenous peoples. They point out that anthropologists are in the 
best position to provide insights into tourism, power and culture for various reasons 
including the specific method of involvement through participant observation and taking 
the long-term view. Macleod identifies the power struggle over resources as a form of 
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control of the nature and expansion of tourism. In fact, the global escalation of concern 
for environmental impacts of tourism (and other economic activity) has not necessarily 
limited this expansion. 
Much of the violence in the CHT since the Peace Accord was signed is related to 
land; it is considered one of the most contentious issues causing conflict between the state 
and the Jummas. During the Jumma insurgency that started in the mid-1970s about 
400,000 poor Bengalis were relocated to the hills under a military scheme (Arens & 
Chakma 2002, D'Costa & Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). These Bengalis were 
provided with food rations and land titles and placed on land previously owned by 
Jumma people mostly through customary forms of ownership. The program embroiled 
poor, landless Bengalis in an armed conflict, where many lost their lives during armed 
clashes. Adnan and Dastidar (2010) identify the forest department as the largest “land 
grabber” in the CHT, followed by the security forces.  
Minoritization, movements and the post-colonial state.  
The processes whereby the state confiscates indigenous lands with dire 
consequences on Jumma lives, is manifested at different levels. It is enabled by the 
production of the Bengali-Muslim nationalist narrative that helps to mobilize consent 
with the purpose of assimilating the Jumma as Bengali ‘others’.  Scholars such as 
Mahmoud Mamdani (2014) have been helpful in this regard, including his argument 
about political identities in post-colonial countries. He proposes that many problems 
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afflicting the post-colonial states are the consequence of how power is organized, and this 
organizational and institutional structure is largely inherited from colonial powers. Along 
with Mamdani, a number of other scholars inform my work including: Eqbal Ahmed 
(1980) in his arguments about the relationship between the colonial state and power in 
modern state formation; Nicholas Dirks (1992) who wrote about the reshaping of cultural 
predicates and categories through colonial encounters; Bernard Cohn (1996) on colonial 
forms of knowledge; Said’s work on   the nexus of knowledge and power; and Partha 
Chatterjee (1993) and his critique of nationalism. Many of these scholars argue that state 
violence against minoritized groups and indigenous populations have their roots in 
colonization. I contextualize the situation in the Hills through its colonial history and how 
the traces of this history may be delineated in present day state ideologies and 
institutions. Mahasweta Devi (1995) is particularly critical of colonization and Partition 
which led formerly colonized countries of South Asia to exercise violence on 
marginalized communities. Needless to say, the colonial legacy is only a partial 
explanation, post-colonial critical thinkers Spivak (1999) and Fanon (2008) shed light on 
the exploitation of subaltern groups in the ‘Third World’. Similarly, Urvashi Butalia 
(2015), Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh (2009) discuss how colonial violence based on 
constructed differences was reproduced by post-colonial nation-states and critique the 
legacy of colonialism within the framework of emerging globalization.  
I then focus on state policies that dispossess and politically disenfranchise the 
Jummas for the benefit of the corporate elite. Dirks and Tsing both argue that it is 
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important to go beyond the general post-colonial critique to “break down the monolith of 
colonialism”, (Dirks 1992) and to analyze nationalist ideologies and institutions “that 
create the minority status” (Tsing 1993). 
The colonial history of the Hills gives a profound insight into the deeply troubled 
relationship between the Bangladeshi state and the Jumma peoples. The Hills were 
formally annexed under British colonial territory in 1860. During this period the 
Chakmas launched a resistance movement against the British (Qanungo 1998, Schendel 
1992, Chowdhury 2016). Even after annexation the British granted the area an ‘excluded 
status’ prohibiting access to it for Bengalis. While this move inadvertently protected the 
Jumma peoples land from external incursions, the provisions of the exclusionary status 
made it much simpler for the British to collect taxes from the Jumma people, but more 
importantly it also became a source of resentment and ‘Othering’ of the Jummas. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter 1 of the thesis is an overview of my research including an outline of what 
the research is about, its objectives, methodology used, and the theoretical sources I use 
to structure my arguments. In Chapter 2, I look at how colonial histories and state 
practices shaped the trajectory of violence, domination and marginalization of 
minoritized, or politically subordinated, groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Looking at 
studies carried out by post-colonial scholars I argue that British colonization and the 
Partition of the Indian sub-continent are part of the historical legacy that has led to state 
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repression fueled by ethnic and religious nationalism in this region. The post-1947 
project of nation- and state-building led to the formation of highly centralized states to 
prevent further secession but also led to violence fed by ideological nationalism. 
Although the present conflict of the Jummas appears to be with the Bangladeshi state, 
conflict with the state predates the formation of Bangladesh and has roots in colonization. 
The violence related to state-controlled tourism in the Hills is one such case where the 
Jumma indigenous people have found themselves at the receiving end of structural 
violence by the state, a process that began long before Bangladesh became an 
independent country, with its annexation into the British empire. In Chapter 3, I use my 
fieldwork to explore how the state consolidates power through military-controlled 
tourism in the Hills causing the Jummas to be further marginalized and dispossessed. 
Militarization is a symbolic dominating tool that defines Bengali-Jumma relations, 
constructs the idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ and normalizes violence. Military presence has 
very different meanings and consequences for the dominant Bengali tourists and the 
subjugated local Jummas. In Chapter 4, I examine present-day tourism in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts and argue that it is underpinned with structural and symbolic violence that 
expedites and expands a four-decade long colonization process by the ruling elite in 
Bangladesh. I argue that the asymmetrical power relationship between Bengali tourists 
and Jumma local residents has evolved through the history of this state expansion on 
Jumma lands, reinforced by present-day violence and impunity, policies that encourage 
exclusionary citizenship and the construction of ethnic hierarchy. In fact, the ethnicity of 
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Jummas has become a tourist commodity, which conceals the structural inequalities 
created by the nation-state between Jummas and Bengalis. I show how tourism in the 
Hills embodies the socio-spatial politics and practices of state territorialisation where the 
struggle over territory, identity and history plays out between the tourists and the locals. 
Chapter 5, is the concluding chapter which will also give a glimpse of how I propose to 
further my research in this field in my PhD work and in what specific ways advocacy and 
research may be entwined in a positive and ethical way. 
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Chapter 2: Violence, conflict and militarization in the Hills 
The roots of much of the identity-based conflicts in South Asia including the violence in 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts can be traced back to colonization and the subsequent Partition 
of India in 1947. During two centuries of colonial rule over the sub-continent Britain 
fomented communal cleavages, resulting in one of the most traumatic partitions in 
history. Perhaps predictably, the massive population displacements following Partition 
led to violence on a mass scale in large areas in the subcontinent, which often took the 
form of identity-based conflicts. The repercussions of Partition and the violence it 
fomented had an amplified effect on small ethnic and religious groups scattered all over 
India and Pakistan. In Bangladesh, the dominant Bengali-Muslim national identity itself 
is a post-colonial construct. It is against this identity construct that the Jumma indigenous 
communities have found themselves a minoritized community struggling against the 
state, for their land and cultural life. Drawing on fieldwork and many years of working in 
the area as a human rights activist, as well as scholarly literature, including the work of 
post-colonial scholars, I follow the political trajectory of the Chittagong Hill Tracts area 
from when it was an independent area, through the Mughal period and colonial era, and 
how it came under the administrative and military rule of Bangladesh. This overview is 
important to explain the present exploitative nature of tourism in the region. 
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The Roots of Violence in Post-Colonial Nation-States 
In his work on knowledge and colonialism, Cohn (1996) argues that colonial 
forms of knowledge enabled conquest as much as it was produced by it. Cohn discusses 
the cultural effects of colonialism, and how British rule set in motion fundamental 
cultural transformations. The colonial administration conducted censuses, registered 
births, marriages and deaths, counted castes, tribes, religious groups and political 
identities. Moreover, British colonial authorities classified people according to categories 
based on their conceptions of the society they colonized. These were techniques that 
buttressed control and domination of the sub-continent (Cohn 1996, Anderson 2003). As 
an anthropologist and historian, Cohn was particularly critical of how colonizers used 
knowledge produced about the ‘natives’ of the sub-continent to further their own 
objectives and maintain their control. Thus, he draws attention to the importance of 
historicizing anthropological findings from the field within the imperial context. 
The categorization of populations by colonial powers along regional divisions 
contributed to the shape of later schisms and violent conflicts in India, mainly, between 
‘Muslim’ Pakistan and ‘Hindu’ India. Later, Pakistan was torn between East and West 
Pakistan, and today this rupture bears on the relationship between the Bengali state and 
the Jumma people of the Hills. Beginning with independence, the Bengali state 
increasingly defined itself as a Bengali-Muslim nation. The merging of the categories 
Bengali and Muslim and the institutional infrastructure of the state were established 
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during colonial rule as explained earlier. In turn, Muslim-Bengali nationalism ‘Othered’ 
non-Bengalis and non-Muslims of Bangladesh, including the Jumma, which historically, 
the British colonizers had segregated from the Bengalis. This social segregation planted 
the seeds of distrust between the two communities. Constituting ten percent of the land 
mass of the country, the independent state of Bangladesh was quick to prioritize a policy 
of militarized control over Jumma territories. This control was largely achieved through 
violence and a visible military presence in the three districts, which makes tourism such a 
contested issue in the Hills.  
Mamdani (2014) argues for exploring the relationship between history and 
politics in the context of violence in order “…to problematize the relationship between 
the historical legacy of colonialism and postcolonial politics” (p. 8). Although Mamdani 
was explaining the Rwandan genocide and its regional context, and colonial roots in 
Africa, his conceptual argument helps in explaining violence in South Asia. He writes 
that perpetrators of violence construct and define the ‘enemy’ as against the self in terms 
of religious, national, racial, or other categories. He argues that the horror of colonialism 
led to “genocidal impulses” (p.9) which is particularly important to understand the cycle 
of violence that continues in post-colonial nation-states.  
As was the case with Pakistan and later Bangladesh centralization and 
authoritarian rule, as well as militarization characterized much of their political histories. 
In this context, Talbot and Singh (2009) observes that the post-1947 project of nation-
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state building led to the formation of highly centralized states to prevent further 
secession, however, it also led to violence fed by ideological nationalism. Das (1995) 
looks further into post-Partition violence into how gendered political violence is and the 
form of structural violence faced by people from certain geographical background faced 
the violence more disproportionately. Although the present conflict in the Hills appears to 
be about the Jumma struggle against the repression of the Bangladeshi state, as 
Chowdhury (2017) explains the struggles waged by the Jumma predates the formation of 
Bangladesh and goes back to their struggle against the British. Along similar lines, Guha 
(1982) argues that the modern historiography of South Asia was dominated by two 
elitisms – the colonialist and the nationalist.  
The Chittagong Hill Tracts During the Mughal Era 
It is believed to be in the 1400s that the first ‘tribes’ called the Kukis migrated to 
the area from the Arakan region, now modern-day Myanmar, followed by Chakmas and 
other communities in later centuries (Chowdhury 2016). Because the political boundaries 
we have today were non-existent, migration and mobility across regions were fairly 
spontaneous and unrestricted during this time (Chowdhury 2016). Before Mughal rule, 
the Chittagong Hill Tracts was an unnamed territory and part of the hilly area between 
the Lushai Hills of Mizoram in east India, and the Tripura state in northern India 
(Schendel, Mey, & Dewan 2000). The District of Chittagong was on the West of the Hills 
and Myanmar on the South, and emerged as a consequence of empire building and 
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territorial spheres of influence.  Schendel argues that the Chittagong Hill Tracts as a unit 
is “a colonial administrative invention” (Dewan 2013). 
By 1612 AD the Mughal state covered the area that is now Bangladesh except for 
the city of Chittagong, which remained under the Arakanese and Portuguese until 1666 
AD, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts which was under independent chiefdoms (Schendel 
2009). Sometime during Mughal rule the Hills began to be referred to as the ‘Kapas 
Mahal’, which means ‘Cotton Area’. During the 17th and 18th century, while the Mughals 
never had direct rule of the region, they tried to strengthen their control over this frontier 
region by promoting cultivation in the area, and by developing trade in cotton with the 
Jummas. The battle of Polashi in 1757 was a major turning point in the history of South 
Asia which led to the establishment of the British East India Company (henceforth the 
Company), which marked the beginning of British Colonial rule over the Indian sub-
continent. The Company’s main task was to collect revenues which helped to fund its 
further expansion in the region, and it continued with the collection of revenue from the 
Jummas after the defeat of the Mughals (Chowdhury 2016). 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts During British Colonialism 
The Chittagong Hill Tracts was so named in 1860 after it was formally annexed to 
the Company. The British entry into the Hills was by collecting tax from the Jummas 
through the authorities in Chittagong. The Jummas used to pay cotton tax to the Mughal 
authorities and the Company essentially inherited this system after the Mughal empire 
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was defeated. During Company rule the Hills were increasingly isolated from the rest of 
Bengal. This demarcation of the Hills as a separate region protected it from outsiders who 
did not habitually cultivate in hilly regions, it also allowed the British to exploit it by 
collecting revenue from the Jumma peoples. The British colonial authorities created 
administrative circles in the three districts: the Chakma Circle in Rangamati, the 
Bohmong Circle in Bandarban, and the Mong Circle in Khagrachari. Furthermore, the 
British created class hierarchies by co-opting the Jumma Circle Chiefs to make revenue 
collection easier for themselves. Cooptation was a method used by colonial authorities, 
represented by the Company, to try to contain a possible revolt originating from the 
Chakma community in the Hills (Qanungo 1998). 
The indigenous administrative structure of the Jummas is a three-tier leadership 
system. The circle chief is also known as the Raja (king) and is the head of the 
community of that circle. He is the main decision-maker of the community and certain 
mauzas (i.e. groups of villages) are under his direct control. Headmen, or chiefs of 
individual mauzas, are under the king in the indigenous administrative structure (Roy 
2000). They also resolve disputes in these mauzas. Karbaris come under the headmen and 
are the leaders of the villages. 
The Company gave the Hill area an ‘excluded’ status, whereby it ensured that 
Bengalis and Jummas did not develop a close relationship, with the exception of Bengali 
migrants brought in to introduce sedentary cultivation to the Jummas. As mentioned 
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earlier, the British rationale for setting up the administrative system under the circle 
chiefs was an attempt to coopt the Jumma and ensure they will not oppose their policies. 
However, they eventually took away the powers of the circle chiefs or the Rajas and the 
headmen, which led to significant discontent among the Jumma elite. Chowdhury (2017) 
argues that the Company’s objective for collecting revenue and separating communities 
based on particular aspects of identity was not merely economic exploitation, but also to 
establish their legitimacy in the region. The economic and historical ties between the port 
city of Chittagong and the Chittagong Hill Tracts area led the British administration to 
believe that this status quo needed to be maintained. 
Moreover, the British colonial authorities placed large amounts of land under 
direct control of the Forest Department, because they wanted to exploit the forest reserves 
directly. They imported saplings from Burma and turned biodiverse forests into mono 
plantations of teak. Teak had great commercial value, but it had negative effects on the 
environment. In addition, they tried to prohibit plains people moving into the hills, 
because they were traders and they feared the locals might become indebted to them and 
thus cause complications in collecting taxes (Chowdhury 2016, Schendel, Mey, & Dewan 
2000). 
In May 1900, the CHT Manual (also known as the CHT Regulation or the CHT 
1900 Act) was set up to exempt the circle chiefs and the Dewans (headmen) from paying 
tax to the Company, and allow the Circle Chiefs the rights to timber plantation 
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(Chowdhury 2016). This was a reward the British granted the Chiefs for collecting taxes 
from the Jumma villagers, and was also as a way of attempting to buy their loyalty. The 
Company clearly discouraged the Bengalis and Jummas from developing close social 
relationships, and instead fostered divisions and animosity between them by privileging 
one group or the other; eventually, this created hostility where one group saw the other as 
more privileged. This was consistent with colonial policies, as the British followed a 
divide and rule policy in Africa and elsewhere, keeping natives apart from one another in 
order to prevent them from questioning the authority of the British, or unifying in a 
rebellion against them. However, divisions continued after formal independence was 
achieved in most of the previously colonized world. Chatterjee (1993) argues that in 
contemporary post-colonial societies, the consolidation of power of the national states has 
led to the markings of a new set of differences. He sees the contemporary battle of 
subordinated groups as a continuity between colonial and postcolonial phases of the 
imposition of the institutions of the modern states. He argues for the necessity of studying 
the specific history of the colonial state, where the colonial representation of the other as 
inferior and radically different, helps to understand the instances of this aspect in 
relations between countries, nations and the normalizing of this othering in contemporary 
states. 
In 1935, the British declared the Hills to be a ‘Totally Excluded Area’ (Roy 2000, 
Chowdhury 2014, Chowdhury 2016). On the one hand, the exclusionary strategy did 
preserve the distinctive economy and ecology of the area, but on the other hand, it 
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planted suspicion between the Jummas and the Bengalis. The 1900 Regulation Manual 
allowed the Company to rule over the Hills with an entirely different set of rules and 
regulations. As a result, it developed as a separate territorial and social unit from the 
greater Bengal Province. 
During British rule, the Hills were first regarded as a non-regulated area, then as 
an excluded area, and then as a totally excluded area. This, Chowdhury points out, 
“placed the Tracts at the periphery of Bengal politics” (Chowdhury 2016). The Hills had 
no electoral representation in the Bengal legislature, so none of the concerns of the 
Jummas ever became of concern for the Bengali political elite.  
Fallout of Partition: The formation of Pakistan, India and Bangladesh  
The role of the British in the Partition of India is well-known; however, its 
repercussions continue to this day. When British colonialism came to an end, colonial 
officials drew a line across the region along religious lines: Pakistan for the Muslims, and 
India for the Hindus. They justified this sectarian division to the presumed irreconcilable 
differences between the Hindu-dominated Congress, and the Muslim League, despite 
centuries of coexistence in pre-colonial times. The Partition, however, also provided them 
with an exit strategy whereby the political turmoil and human tragedy that followed such 
an upheaval, would water down any attempts by the natives to hold the colonial power 
accountable for the direct domination and exploitation of the region, and its people, and 
any of its consequences. In fact, the constitution of the population inside the sub-
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continent was much more complicated and reducing them to these two binary categories 
was never really in the people’s favor. The British had collected quantitative data through 
censuses during their rule, and colonial researchers had collected extensive qualitative 
information about the people throughout the region. Ironically, the British were very 
aware of the fallacy of this binary identity-based Partition. The fallout was predictable 
and led to one of the largest human tragedies in the region. Mass displacements, riots, 
massacres, and land grabbing devastated the region (Talbot & Singh 2009). 
The Partition ran right through the Bengal region and Hindu-majority Bengal 
became part of India while Muslim-dominated Bengal became part of Pakistan (East 
Pakistan, present day Bangladesh). Partition led to the carving of the sub-continent and to 
violence all over South Asia and beyond. It also led to strained relationship between India 
and Pakistan and eventually Bangladesh. The tension between these three countries 
continues to this day and the fact that Bangladesh and India share a border along the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts meant that much of the tension between the Jumma people and the 
state is influenced by India-Bangladesh relations. In fact, the CHT Accord between the 
Jumma rebels and the Bangladesh government is said to have come about as a result of 
India’s withdrawal of support of the Jummas (CHT Commission 2000). 
Although the Partition was justified as a means to resolve conflicts, the Partition 
of the sub-continent has in fact worsened the social schisms and fomented religious and 
ethnic-led conflicts and violence that had not existed in these areas. In the immediate 
  
48 
 
aftermath of Partition, 15 million people were displaced, between 200,000 according to 
the British and 2million according to Indian estimate people were killed (Butalia 2000, p. 
3), and at least 100,000 women were raped (Talbot and Singh 2009). Butalia, who herself 
comes from a family of Partition refugees, has compiled stories of people “harking back 
to an often-mythical past” where Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs were part of the same 
community with no traces of the differences brought about by Partition. In speaking 
about post-Partition violence against Sikhs in India, she invokes Partition and her own 
shock in how people from the same community “…could, once divided, do terrible things 
to each other” (p. 5). 
Moreover, not only are India, Bangladesh and Pakistan constantly negotiating or 
competing for regional power and influence among them, but within each of these 
countries, minoritized groups have had prolonged struggles with the state. It is possible to 
suggest that the trauma of the Partition made the three states more distrustful of the 
autonomy sought by indigenous populations. Although this question will not be dealt 
with in this thesis, it is important to note, if briefly, that the ‘Othering’ of particular 
populations within a country, or constructing other countries as enemies, such as India 
versus Pakistan, or Bangladesh versus Pakistan plays a role in preserving the status quo 
by redirecting economic inequalities, class conflicts, and political problems within these 
states towards a constructed ‘enemy’. Identifying an ‘enemy’ of the nation helps states 
and ruling elites in mobilizing people across classes against another group.  
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The struggle by the people of Kashmir and the North East with the Indian state, 
the status of the people of Balochistan in Pakistan and the struggle for self-determination 
by the Jummas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are all instances of this homogenizing 
attempts by the state, and a nationalist response which regards pluralism as a threat. 
Violence and repression were and are still used by all these post-colonial states in dealing 
with questions of land rights of the indigenous people. The fallacy that the British created 
two homogenous nation-states based on religious affiliation was felt most violently in the 
secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971. The cleavage between the two 
started appearing very soon after Partition, when the Pakistani state declared that Urdu 
would become the state language of Pakistan (Ali 2010). Consequently, the Bengalis of 
East Pakistan resisted the assimilation attempt and the differences between these two 
parts of the country along cultural, linguistic and geographical lines became. A protest by 
university students on February 21, 1952 against the state’s decision was dealt with in a 
heavy-handed manner and led to the killing of a number of students by the police (Ali 
2010, p. 17). This day also marked the official beginning of the resistance movement of 
the Bengalis – eventually an independence movement- against the Pakistan state where 
the Bengalis emphasized language, culture and secular values to differentiate themselves 
from the Pakistani-Muslim identity. Between March and December 1971, the Pakistan 
military killed an estimated one to three million people, mostly Bengalis and according to 
some accounts around 200,000 mostly Bengali women were raped by the military where 
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many of them were also purposefully impregnated (Mookherjee 2006, D’Costa 2011, 
Islam 2012). 
Singh (2010) argues that freedom became elusive to different communities of 
people in South Asia after Partition. Independence from British colonial rule, however, 
did not end the oppression of minoritized communities like the Jummas.  As Singh 
(2010) points out, Partition increased the “minority complex amongst other ethnic groups 
in the two states” (p. 11). Religion failed to work as a unifying factor for Pakistan, and 
apart from the distance between East and West Pakistan, language and other 
distinguishing factors were emphasized deepening the fissures between the dominating 
West and subjugated East Pakistan. The war and the eventual formation of Bangladesh as 
a sovereign nation-state exposed the flawed premises of Partition, which was especially 
detrimental for the Jummas in East Pakistan as they were not Muslim and suddenly found 
themselves part of Muslim Pakistan. The politics of Partition placed the Jumma under the 
Pakistanis and then under Bengalis of Bangladesh, a state that similarly denied them 
autonomous space. Thus, the original sin of Partition largely orchestrated by the British 
denied the Jumma from determining their political identity. 
The Bengal Boundary Commission, which was assigned to draw the border 
between India and Pakistan was formed only six weeks before the British withdrew from 
India. Although the main basis for the Partition was along ‘Muslims’ and ‘Non-Muslims’ 
lines, the Commission was also to take into consideration ‘other factors’ (Schendel 2004). 
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Although the ‘other factors’ were vague, the deciding factor for placing the Hills under 
Muslim Pakistan was its proximity to the important port city of Chittagong. In the 
meantime, under the expressed premise of Partition, the Indian and Burmese flags were 
raised in different parts of the Hills before the official announcements came from the 
British colonial authorities (Schendel 2001). The flag incident was the first contribution 
to the discourse of the Jummas as ‘traitors’ and has been used against the indigenous 
people of the Hills ever since. Schendel (2004) identifies this incident and the subsequent 
“doubts on allegiance” (p. 48) as having affected the Hills ‘most destructively’ and the 
raising of the Indian flag as being the “core symbol of the district’s treason to the state of 
Pakistan” (p. 48), an idea promoted in Pakistan’s nationalist discourse. 
The perception of the Jummas as having allegiance to India explains why the 
Pakistan government did not consult with them regarding damaging “development” 
projects in the Hills, particularly the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric dam. In 
1961 the Pakistan Government, with financial sponsorship from the United State Agency 
for International Development (USAID), completed the construction of the dam over the 
Karnaphuli River in the Rangamati district. The dam submerged 40 percent of the 
cultivable land (54000 acres) of the district and displaced nearly 100,000 mostly 
Chakmas, turning them into environmental refugees. There was very little compensation 
provided to the people and some 40,000 Chakmas migrated as asylum-seekers to the area 
that later became known as Arunachal Pradesh in India in 1964 (Singh 2010). 
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The independence of Bangladesh should have provided some relief for the 
Jummas as the new nation-state defined itself as secular in its constitution, but the Jumma 
soon realized their political rights and rights to autonomy was under threat. Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, who led the independence movement for Bangladesh and became the 
first president was an ardent Bengali nationalist, and Jummas had no separate political or 
cultural space in the state’s national project. In fact, the idea that the Jumma’s are 
disloyal and treacherous remains deeply ingrained in the public national discourse about 
them. 
During Bangladesh’s movement for independence most Jummas remained neutral 
as there was no natural affiliation for either the Pakistan state (led by a nationalism 
underpinned by political Islam) or the Bangladeshi state (led by Bengali nationalism). 
Further, the Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy received a political position in the Pakistan 
government. After Bangladesh’s independence, the Chakma Raja settled down in 
Pakistan permanently and never returned to his home land. This led to a Bengali 
nationalist resentment towards the Chakma Raja. Violence erupted in the Hills among the 
Bengalis in 2012 following his death in Pakistan when the news spread that his ashes 
would be brought to his hometown of Rangmati (Daily JaiJaiDin 2012). This eventually 
never materialized. Further to this, in May 2017, the High Court in Bangladesh passed a 
judgment that the name of Chakma Raja Tridev Roy would be removed from all public 
installations, following a writ petition by two individuals from Rangamati. Clearly this 
was more of a symbolic value than anything else. 
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The post-1947 project had created centralized states, one of the main reasons 
being to prevent further secessions. In discussing the centralization of power in post-
colonial states, Ahmed (1980) argues that in the effort to create modern states these 
countries developed a military bureaucratic superstructure of power on an 
underdeveloped infrastructure of participation. He points out that these states exert power 
through coercive means and systematic violations of human rights, which is a very 
common aspect of such systems. Post-1947 state building underpinned by nationalist 
ideologies, led states to develop assimilationist policies to exert power over minorities. 
These policies then became points of discontent for minoritized groups and led to armed 
movements for self-determination. The formation of Bangladesh as an independent 
country was one such case. Talbot and Singh (2009) have pointed out that although the 
Partition was a divide along religious lines, ethnic consolidation of different groups and 
communities were also furthered through this divide. 
Colonial Roots of Representation of the Jummas as the Exotic Native 
Between 1795-1815 AD, Francis Buchanan visited different parts of Bengal and 
carried out surveys which are one of the first known surveys of the area. However, 
Buchanan’s accounts of the southeastern region collected in 1798, which includes the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, was not discovered and published until 200 years later by 
Schendel. Buchanan spent two and a half months traveling through Chittagong, the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Tripura, Arakan, Manipur, Mizoram and Burma beginning in 
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March 1798. Although the main objective of Buchanan’s visit was to find out whether 
spice could be profitably produced in the hilly region, he also wrote down extensive 
details about the social life of the people in the areas he visited. Buchanan, who is 
believed to be the first traveler who has left written accounts of the Hill area, documented 
his observations before the Hills became formally annexed to the British empire. This 
may have played an important role in facilitating the formal annexation some 60 years 
following the visit. Although Buchanan was critical of some of British policies in the 
sub-continent, there is little doubt that he supported the colonization process in principle 
and his documentation was crucial in the Company’s expansion in the region. Schendel 
(1992) points out that Buchanan’s manuscript is illustrative of “the ‘ethnocentric’ views 
held by ‘enlightened’ Europeans at the time” and that “all European sources on early 
colonial Asia suffer from similar prejudices, blind spots and distortions” (p. xix). 
There is very little visual representation of the Jumma people during British 
colonial times, and as Schendel (2002) noted this is due to the fact that there was very 
little interest in the area by anthropologists, archaeologists and tourists at the time. 
However, a number of British and German photographers have done visual work on the 
Mro, Lushai, Khumi and the Pankhowa people, which say something about who these 
groups are. The colonial documenters were especially fascinated with the nudity of the 
Mro communities, evidenced by many photos featuring bare-breasted women and men 
with loin cloths. This was a way to demonstrate their primitiveness and it fit in perfectly 
with the label of the ‘native’. Most of the photos also show that they were posed for the 
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occasion and were not taken during their ordinary daily activities. Schendel (2002) points 
this out in how they “had to prepare them for the Western scientific eye by having them 
almost undress, lined up in an orderly manner and deprived of any social context” (p. 
346). 
The above-mentioned construction of an inferior and exotic ‘Other’ invokes 
Said’s (1979) critique of Western approaches to intellectual inquiry of the ‘Oriental’ by 
illustrating how Western scholars especially in the 19th century, produce patronizing 
representations of the East. His criticism of such representations was that the body of 
knowledge produced by Western scholars presupposes an essential difference between 
East and West, and in which the West is the superior subject of history, and the ‘East’ its 
inferior object of history and study. These representations are used alongside or 
accompany political, economic and military domination. Similarly, Cohn (1996) argued 
that colonial forms of knowledge production in the context of the Indian sub-continent, 
reinforce British superiority and the construction of the native indigenous other, as one 
with static cultural and racial essences. Present-day Bengali tourists are in fact also 
reproducing this colonial, orientalist gaze, enabled by a tourist industry controlled by the 
state primarily through its military forces.  
History of the Military in Bangladesh 
The Bangladesh military was formed after the country’s independence from 
Pakistan in 1971. Many of the officers in the newly independent country’s military were 
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members of the Pakistan military along with those who were members of Mukti Bahini 
(Freedom Fighters), who fought in the war against Pakistan. Approximately 28,000 of the 
36,000 military officers in the Bangladesh army were repatriated soldiers from the 
Pakistan army (Bhattacharjee 2010, p. 3). The repatriated soldiers in 1973 may have 
some significance over the modeling of the military after that of the Pakistan Army. 
Following independence, the Awami League government received support from 
India as it was seen as a secular political group. Sheikh Mujib, the leader of Awami 
League, came to be known as the Father of the Nation. He became authoritarian and 
prohibited representation of other political groups in the national government. He 
justified his authoritarian style by posing as the guardian of unity and arguing it was 
necessary to prevent further disintegration of the country.  
In the newly formed state a lot of the important positions in the military remained 
vacant for a while. The first national election in an independent Bangladesh was held in 
1973. Islamist groups, who were perceived as pro-Pakistan were banned from 
participating in the election, but there were many left-leaning political groups who were 
very unhappy with Sheikh Mujib’s authoritarian leadership. However, in the election, 
amidst wide allegations of vote rigging the Awami League declared that they had 
collected 97 percent of the seats in parliament. In December 1974 Mujib who was 
increasingly losing his popularity, declared a state of emergency, introduced a single-
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party presidential system, declared himself to be the new all-powerful head of state, and 
eventually removed all democratic rights of the people (Riaz 2016).  
It was during this political crisis that the Bangladesh military first entered the 
political arena and the public got a preview of things to come in the future. The 55,000-
strong Bangladesh military was composed of Pakistan era professional soldiers – some of 
whom had joined as freedom fighters in the war against Pakistan while many of them 
were stranded in prison camps in West Pakistan during the war. In post-independence 
Bangladesh, however, there were several reasons why the Bangladesh military soldiers 
became disgruntled: firstly, because they believed that the glory of their victory was 
taken away from them by the Indian government, secondly because of the formation of a 
parallel force by Mujib under the name of Rokkhi Bahini, and thirdly because of Mujib’s 
closeness to India (Schendel 2009). There was also dissatisfaction over the decrease in 
resource allocation and personal rivalries within the military between those who 
participated in the war of Independence for Bangladesh and those who were repatriated 
from West Pakistan in 1973 (Riaz 2016). On 15 August 1975, the military assassinated 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and more than 40 members of his family and household staff at 
his own home. His daughter, Sheikh Rehana and Sheikh Hasina, the present Prime 
Minister of the country, were in Europe at the time. The coup was engineered by 30 
junior military officers (Riaz 2016, p. 59). 
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This turned into a political crisis of proportions that the new nation was not 
prepared to handle, and military dictatorship became the modus operandi for governance. 
Initially the military installed Khandaker Mushtaq Ahmed, a minister under Mujib as the 
President of the country with other Awami League leaders as cabinet members. There 
was uncertainty following the killing of Sheikh Mujib and the power struggle between 
various military officers and political leaders within the Awami League clearly 
demonstrated that no one was in control of the country’s leadership. Several coups and 
attempted coups were carried out by the military during this time. One such coup led 
military officers to assassinate four prominent Awami League leaders inside a prison. 
These four Awami League leaders were close to Sheikh Mujib and jailed by the military 
following his assassination. A soldiers’ mutiny on 7 November 1975 saw the killing of 
around 33 officers and 100 enlisted men. It is believed to be one of the largest mutinies 
since the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 (Riaz 2016). Through this political chaos, coups and 
counter-coups General Ziaur Rahman installed himself as a commander in 1975 and in 
1977 officially became the new president of the country. 
Ziaur Rahman immediately raised the defense budget of the country from 7 
percent to 20 percent. It also took up an economic policy of de-nationalisation and by 
1982 a total of 236 industrial units were denationalized (Riaz 2016). Political power 
wrangling within the military itself continued throughout Zia’s term. In October 1977 
another, and to date the most violent, coup was carried out by the military where more 
than 200 soldiers, army officers and air force officers were killed in an otherwise failed 
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attempt to topple Zia’s military leadership. However, President Zia was subsequently 
assassinated in yet another military coup in 1981 and the country quickly went under a 
state of emergency. 
Following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975 the country went under 15 
years of de facto military rule first with General Ziaur Rahman as the president from 
1975-81, and then by General Hussain Muhammad Ershad from 1982-90. Ershad also 
took power of the country through a coup but during his eight-year dictatorship, 
Bangladesh Awami League (founded by Sheikh Mujib and then led by one his surviving 
daughters Sheikh Hasina), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (founded by Ziaur Rahmana and 
then led by his widow Khaleda Zia) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the Islamic political party 
formed by those who opposed the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan) led a 
movement to restore democracy in the country (Ali 2010). Sheikh Hasina, Mujib’s 
daughter, who had been abroad since before her father’s death, came back to Bangladesh 
in 1981 and took part in the election as which was widely publicized as a return to 
democracy. The two military dictatorships were repressive, limited democratic rights of 
the people and contributed to the manipulation of the constitutional process (Riaz 2016).  
A military-led government returned in 2007 in the form of military-backed 
caretaker government when the country’s two main political groups, the Awami League 
and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party went head to head against each other prior to a 
nationwide general election. Confronted with a lack of consensus over election rules and 
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regulations and increased violence across the country the military took over, and stayed 
in power behind a caretaker government for nearly two years. Hundreds of people were 
killed in the violence of the two political parties. The military officially took over on 
January 11 of 2007 and promised to solve the political stalemate. Initially there was 
widespread support for the military intervention as the general people were getting 
infuriated with the daily political violence. Soon however it seemed the military had 
greater political ambitions than was initially perceived. The caretaker government filed 
corruption cases against the top leaders of both the political parties, murder cases against 
Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, physical presence of the military started increasing in the 
public spaces and the media were forced to publish the official version of the new 
provided by the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the military 
intelligence section of the Bangladesh Armed Forces. It almost began to replicate the 
CHT situation for the rest of the country. 
In February 2009, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), a paramilitary force, carried out 
one of the bloodiest military coups since the restoration of democracy. The BDR’s 
mandate is mainly to guard the country’s borders and to assist the military during state 
emergencies. A total of 74 people, including 57 top level army officers were killed in the 
mutiny (Rabbi 2017). Hundreds of BDR officers were sentenced to death in mass trials 
which were termed ‘unfair’ by independent observers. Since the institution’s reputation 
became ‘tainted’ by this mutiny, the BDR was subsequently renamed Border Guards 
Bangladesh (BGB). This incident revealed the deep division that had developed between 
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upper and lower ranking officers over financial advantages that the military was enjoying 
over the border guards. 
The BDR headquarters is situated in the heart of Dhaka’s residential area in 
Dhanmondi. The Rifles School and the residences of the families of those who work for 
the BDR are also inside this heavily guarded area. In fact, many of the armed forces 
establishments are housed within residential neighborhoods. The Dhaka Cantonment is 
also situated in the heart of the most densely populated city in the world and public 
vehicles are not allowed to ply through it. This adds to the congested traffic situation on 
all sides of the little bubble, but families of the military officers live unperturbed by the 
traffic situation that is created because of their enclosed and privileged community life. 
Dhaka is currently the most densely populated city in the world and considering that 16 
million people live inside Dhaka City, an area that does not exceed 10,000 people per 
square kilometer, one can imagine the power, prestige and impunity that the military 
institution enjoys. There are checkpoints at the entrances of both the BDR Headquarters 
and the Dhaka Cantonment which are controlled by armed guards, who prohibit civilians 
from entering without a valid reason. The appearance of both these areas loom in stark 
contrast to the rest of the city. The cantonments are clean, orderly and organized, and the 
atmosphere is enhanced with lush greenery. In contrast, the rest of the city is a scene of 
chaos where people travel along dangerous roads to get from one part of the city to 
another in traffic jams, and where the sight of greenery is becoming increasingly rare. As 
of 2011, the Bangladesh Armed Forces had approximately 220,950 serving personnel. 
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The military has been directly or indirectly involved with the country’s political life 
throughout its 46-year history. There have been periods of military rule, several coups, 
mutinies and attempted coups. Even when the military is not directly running the 
government, they are known to exert considerable authority over the civilian government 
regarding important political decisions regardless of which political party is in power. 
The Characterization of the Bangladesh Military as ‘Bengali-Muslim’ 
Nearly 90 percent of the present population of Bangladesh are Muslims (BBS), 
but political Islam is a fairly new construct. It was the military leaders who scrapped 
secularism and introduced Islam as the state religion in the constitution and made it 
permissible for Islamic political groups to take part in the elections. The country’s 
independence architect and first leader Sheikh Mujib was very determined to distance the 
new nation of Bangladesh from its earlier Muslim representation under Pakistan. Thus, 
when the country’s first constitution was crafted, ‘secularism’ was one of the founding 
pillars of the constitution along with ‘socialism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘nationalism’. It was 
the military dictator Ziaur Rahman who removed ‘secularism’ from the constitution in 
1977 and replaced it with: “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah”, and declared that 
Islam would be the state religion. In the 15th amendment to the constitution in 2011 the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court restored secularism in the constitution but retained Islam as 
the state religion.  
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The military ruler Ziaur Rahman also rescinded a constitutional provision 
prohibiting religion-based parties from participating in national elections (Riaz & Raji 
2011). Following the military coup Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and the 
military declared Bangladesh to be an Islamic state (Riaz 2016). As Karim (1998) 
observed, by bringing the phrase Bismillah ir rahman ir rahim (in the name of Allah, the 
glorious and the all merciful) at the beginning of all state functions, including state-
controlled media, the nation reifies the Bangladeshi citizen and state as Muslim. This 
marginalizes the indigenous communities in Bangladesh who live on the margins of the 
state. 
The two consecutive military-led dictatorships were pivotal in bringing religion 
into the political arena (Riaz 2016). Although Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League was 
initially adamant about keeping religion out of politics, by the time Sheikh Hasina came 
to power, the party could no longer go back to those secular ideals and in fact has 
repeatedly and openly tried to appeal to the Islamic political groups in formulating 
national policies. The other main political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 
whose leader is the widow of the former military dictator, has a formal coalition with 
Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamic political group many of whose members were 
sympathetic towards a unified Muslim-Pakistan. Since 1970 the number of Islamist 
parties have risen from 11 to 100 in 2006 (Riaz & Raji 2011). Through the efforts of the 
military leaders the influence of political Islam on Bangladesh’s cultural, social and 
political life has been on the rise. This emerging political setting combined with 
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increasing poverty rates, youth unemployment and a regional influence (mainly from 
Gulf oligarchies) makes for a fertile ground for nurturing Islamist politics, some of which 
has led to violence. 
Although the 1971 war of independence was fought on the basis of Bengali 
nationalism and there were active efforts from within the leadership to include Bengalis 
of all religions in the movement, in independent Bangladesh and with military 
involvement in politics, a chauvinistic nationalism emerged. Soon the ‘nation’ was 
represented as Bengali-Muslim whereby Hindus, Christians, Buddhists and others 
became the national ‘Other’. In this national project the Jummas were further 
marginalized. The issue of national identity, in fact, is a topic of very heated discussions 
in national politics, and where ethnicity, religion and sovereignty are key concepts 
debated in these discussions (Schendel 2001). Political Islam by definition privileges 
religious nationalism and its adherents see the Muslim-Bengali identity as the ‘authentic’ 
national identity. The military establishment in general, and the military rulers in 
particular, have used religious nationalism to manipulate people’s sentiments in their 
pursuit for power, as well as maintaining their overwhelming presence in the Hills. 
Although there is resistance to it from within civil society, political Islam has come to 
play a considerable role in the national life of Bangladesh, its adherents at different times 
and to differing degrees may influence national policies related to women’s status, 
unleash terror threats on cultural activities deemed ‘secular’, repress freedom of speech, 
and unleash hate speech on religious minorities. There has also been a rise of religious 
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nationalism in Bangladesh, an ideology that emerged following the failure of independent 
post-colonial nation-state to deliver on its promises of freedom and economic 
prosperities. These groups are a regional phenomenon, and influenced by the rise of 
armed groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in the Middle East, known by its 
acronym ISIS, and who use “Islam” in their name to grant themselves a puritan religious 
aura and justify their criminality. 
Islamization has been one of the state policy for occupation of the Hills. Chakma 
and Hill (2013) note that from 1982 to 2001 the number of mosques in the Hills increased 
over four-fold and madrasas [religious schools] over forty-four-fold. The Saudi-owned 
NGOs’ presence is said to be influential in Islamization (CHT Commission 1991). A 
number of Tripura children have been taken away from their families to madrasahs 
outside the CHT. Many of the children are abducted by the madrasahs but many are 
simply bought off with the support of Islamic NGOs (Kapaeeng Foundation 2013, p. 
192). In some of these cases, the families of the Jumma children are too poor to put up a 
resistance. Jumma communities have also been targeted for proselytization by Christian 
missionaries from long before (Islam 2013). Lushai communities have almost entirely 
become Christian as a result. However, the targeting for Islamization has been part of 
state’s strategy of occupation, land acquisition and to suppress the Jumma people’s fight 
for self-determination. For example, when changing the Jumma names of neighborhoods 
in the Hills the state has followed a Muslim naming procedure. Some places have simply 
been renamed Muslim para or Islam para from their former Jumma names. The state 
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possibly perceived that people would follow more caution in resisting Islamic naming 
rather than to Bengali naming. 
The Bangladesh Military’s Corporate Interests 
The military in Bangladesh, as in many other countries, is an important part of the 
state machinery and its function is not restricted to the defence of the state and its 
citizens. The Bangladesh military dominates other state institutions and has played a big 
role in the political history of the country. It has been directly involved with 
infrastructure development and has considerable commercial ventures across the country. 
The Bangladesh military is a very powerful and politically influential body in 
Bangladesh (Bhattacharjee 2010). It has many profit-making endeavors under its welfare 
trust, the Sena Kalyan Sangstha. It owns one of the biggest 5-star hotels in the country 
(The Radisson), it owns flour mills, ice-cream factories, food industries, real estate, 
infrastructure projects etc. Moreover, the military’s corporate interests are not included in 
the formal defence budget of the country. In fact, the corporate military is completely 
outside this structure. This income is not only over and above their formal income, but 
also helps them to form another layer of control over civilian population.  
UN agencies have a strong presence in occupied and conflict-ridden areas around 
the world. Bangladesh is one of the largest troops contributing country in the world and 
for military officers it is a big source of income and pride (Haque 2012, 29 May). In 2011 
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the Bangladesh government responded harshly to a report by a UN special rapporteur for 
questioning the human rights record of the military in the Hills (CHT Commission 2011, 
July 12). Since 2000, there has been an increase of 280 percent troop contribution to the 
UN peacekeeping operations and army officers from Bangladesh make up 93 percent of 
the UN Peacekeepers (Zaman and Biswas 2012). 
In her research of the Pakistan army’s corporate interests, Siddiqa (2010) coins 
the term ‘milbus’ to describe what she says is the “peculiar kind of military capital” (p. 1) 
that drives the political ambitions of the armed forces. The Bangladesh military, because 
of its historical connections with the Pakistan military, styles its corporate interests after 
them too. It is particularly important to study the military’s business interests as its 
financial transactions are not subjected to any public scrutiny and largely remain outside 
the jurisdiction of the civilian government (Chatterjee 2010). 
The military’s business interests and its political influence over national policies 
are inseparable. The authoritarian nature of the institution helps it to maintain lack of 
transparency over its businesses and gives it unparalleled power over the civilian 
government and society. Many in Bangladeshi media and outside observers speculate that 
Awami League came to power in 2009 because it had an understanding with the military 
(Chaudhury 2012). Chatterjee’s (2010) study of the Bangladesh military’s business 
interest has a noticeable absence of these interests or the military occupation in the Hills. 
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Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts: A National Project 
Unlike the rest of the country the military in the Hills work under a specific and 
confidential directive known as Operation Uttoron (Upliftment) which was enforced by 
the Government of Bangladesh in 2001 to replace the earlier Operation Dabanol 
(Wildfire), which was in operation through an order by the military dictator Hussain 
Mohammad Ershad during the period of the armed conflict which gave authority to the 
military officials to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the Hills. Operation Uttoron 
is believed to have the same authority as Operation Dabanol (IWGIA 2012, p. 10). 
Ever since Bangladesh’s independence, and the Jumma people’s movement for 
self-determination, the Hills and the Jummas of the Hills have been placed under this 
national security discourse and have become the nation’s other. Policies and actions 
related to the Hills are subject to approval by the military and not merely a matter of the 
civilian government. In fact, military officers are always present in civil society meetings 
and gatherings.  
In 1972 the Jumma people formed the Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s 
Party or the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samily (PCJSS) to fight against the 
Bangladeshi state’s repressive policies and attempt to assimilate the Jumma people. After 
the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, military dictator Ziaur Rahman looked for a 
brutal military solution to the Jumma people’s claims. This led to full-fledged armed 
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conflict between the military and Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), the armed wing of the 
PCJSS.  
The PCJSS points out: “In place of ensuring the special administrative system 
with the CHT Regional Council and three Hill District Councils, while maintaining ‘de 
facto’ military rule and supremacy of the army in the name of ‘Operation Uttoron’, these 
Councils have been made totally dysfunctional” (PCJSS, E-newsletter, Nov 30, 2016). 
Just as the Pakistani state denied the regional autonomy demanded by East Pakistan, in 
independent Bangladesh the Bengali state refused autonomy to the Jumma people of the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts. This resulted in discontent among the Jumma population who felt 
politically and economically marginalized in post-independence Bangladesh and its focus 
on Bengali-Muslim nationalism. And just like West Pakistan tried to quash this 
movement for self-determination through military means, the Bangladeshi state sent the 
military off to the Hills to tame the Jumma people’s movement through repressive means. 
In February 1972 Manabendra Narayan Larma (Chakma Member of Parliament) 
went to Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to seek autonomy for the 
Hills. Rahman turned down Larma’s request saying that there could only be one nation in 
Bangladesh and asked the Jummas to “become Bengali”. He further threatened to send 
Bengalis into the CHT so that Jummas would become minorities there (Mohsin 1997). 
This hostile response from the founding leader of the country, and the person who led the 
movement for self-determination of the Bengali people, resulted in the indigenous Jumma 
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people of Hills to take up an armed struggle for autonomy. Anderson (2003) argues that 
the nationalist post-colonial states often became authoritarian in nature and the colonial 
policy of minoritization continued with a national policy of homogenization. 
In 1976 General Ziaur Rahman, the military dictator, formed the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Development Board and appointed the Area Commander of Chittagong 
Cantonment as Chairman (Faiz and Mohaiemen 2010). The Shanti Bahini (Peace Forces) 
was formed soon after that and led the armed struggle for self-determination until 
December 1997. In May 1977, in response to an attack on the military by the Shanti 
Bahini, the military deployed additional armed forces to the area until there was one 
soldier for every five Hill residents (Faiz & Mohaiemen, 2010). 
Over the three decades of armed struggle the Bangladesh military set up six 
military garrisons in the three hill districts of the CHT and more than 500 military camps. 
According to Roy (2001) there was anywhere between 35,000 and 114,500 military 
personnel posted in the CHT in 2001, after the Accord had been signed. One-third of the 
entire Bangladesh army was deployed in the CHT at that time and the number of 
indigenous people in the area was about 600,000 (Roy, 2001). During the armed conflict, 
the military also brought in 400,000 poor and landless Bengalis from the plainlands of 
Bangladesh and gave them land titles and food rations (Arens & Chakma 2002, D'Costa 
& Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). The settlers however did not realize that the 
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they were brought in as human shields for the military there. Hundreds of settlers were 
also killed during the armed conflict by Shanti Bahini (Hazarika 1989, June 11). 
During the period of the armed struggle the Bangladesh military carried out at 
least 11 mass killings in the Hills, in most of the cases, there is no record of the number 
of people who were killed (Table 1). One such massacre was carried out in Kalampati 
(Kaokhali) in Rangamati Hill District. It is said that the local army commander invited 
Jummas of the area to a meeting at a Buddhist temple and ordered officers to open fire on 
the gathering which killed between 200-300 people (Roy 2000). This led Bengali settlers 
in the area to carry out a further attack on Buddhist temples and Chakma homes in the 
area. A number of indigenous women were raped during the military operation of the 
1980s and 1990s. During this period there were a number of retaliatory attacks by Shanti 
Bahini on Bengali settlers which led to counter-retaliatory attacks by settlers and the 
army on the Jummas continue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In December 1980 the 
military government passed the Disturbed Area Bill, giving Chittagong Police Sub-
Inspector and any Non-Commissioned Army Officers the right to shoot individuals 
suspected of illegal activities, and the right to raid any home suspected of storing 
weapons (Faiz and Mohaiemen 2010). The targeted massacres and mass rapes carried out 
by the Bangladeshi military in the Hills have not been acknowledged by the Government 
of Bangladesh. Amnesty International (1986), Survival International, the CHT 
Commission (1991, 1994, 1997, 2001) and Anti-Slavery Society (1994) are some of the 
international human rights organizations who have reported about these cases. 
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Table 1: A list of the massacres carried out by the military in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. (Source: Bhumitra 
Chakma, University of Hull). 
The military has a very strong presence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. In addition 
to the military, 10,000 personnel from the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), along with 
another 10,000 Ansar and Armed Police Battalions (APBn) personnel are also deployed 
in the area, making a total of 50,000-60,000 armed personnel stationed in the CHT 
(IWGIA 2012). In addition, the Village Defense Party (VDP), a voluntary paramilitary 
force organized under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is recruited largely from Bengali 
villagers and trained by the police. The total number of VDP members in Bangladesh is 
approx. 5.6 million. 
In addition to the violence, 400,000 Bengali settlers were strategically placed in 
cluster villages near the army barracks to serve as human shields (Arens & Chakma 2002, 
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D'Costa & Chakma 2008, CHT Commission, et. al.). This change the demography of the 
Hills very rapidly. In 1947 Jummas made up 98 per cent of the population in the Hills, by 
1991 this figure dropped to 51 per cent (Mohsin 1997). Occupiers make deliberate efforts 
to alter the demographic features of the occupied territory either by deportation and 
expulsion of those occupied or through population transfer from the ranks of the occupier 
(Falk 2013). Although the rebels conceded defeat in 1997 the military never left the 
region in accordance with the ‘Peace’ Accord that was signed between the rebels and the 
government. To this day one-third of the entire Bangladesh military personnel are 
deployed in the CHT with a ratio of one soldier per 40 civilians (IWGIA, 2012). 
Since the signing of the 1997 CHT Accord a number of interest groups have 
formed in the Hills, including a division within the Jumma people’s movement. A 
number of Jummas opposed the signing of the Accord and they later went and formed the 
United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) in 1998 with its own student wing and 
women’s wing. Somo Odhikar Andolon (Equal Rights Movement) was formed with the 
strong support of Bangladesh Nationalist Party but now has support from all national 
political parties who receive funds from the military’s pacification program and are 
primarily responsible for organizing attacks on Jumma people (IWGIA 2012). In 2007 a 
number of leaders from PCJSS broke away from the main party and formed the PCJSS 
(Reformist). Apart from arson attacks on common Jumma peoples, there have been a lot 
of violence among these groups over the years and have added to the overall volatile 
situation in the Hills. The UNDP has a sizable project, the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
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Development Facility (CHTDF) in the region and works with the government, the 
military as well as the Regional Council and Hill Districts Council, but there is very little 
independent assessment of their role. 
After Bangladesh became an independent country there was fear among the ruling 
elite of a further identity-based secessionist movement within Bangladesh as there had 
been growing disenfranchisement among the Jummas during the East Pakistan period, 
coupled with the Chakma Raja’s cooperation with West Pakistan. When the first 
constitution of the country was being formulated the Jummas approached the new Prime 
Minister to discuss the future of the CHT with the goal that it should be an autonomous 
area within the state and that there should be constitutional safeguards for the Jummas. 
Braithewaite & D'Costa (2012) argue that the armed conflict was not a struggle for the 
independence of the Hills but rather a level of autonomy to that which the Jummas 
historically had. This was denied. In the new constitution there was no recognition of the 
distinct identity of the Jummas and the Prime Minister asked the Jumma delegation to 
adopt the Bengali identity.  The PCJSS was formed as a response to this rejection and its 
armed wing Shanti Bahini started mobilizing an armed struggle from the mid-1970s. The 
Bangladesh military suppressed the uprising by violent means and carried out torture, 
rape and mass killings of Jumma people in several villages for more than two decades. 
Nationalist military movements routinely view violence as an acceptable method of 
suppressing self-determination movements of minoritized communities. Liyanage (2007), 
when speaking about the CHT and comparing it to other countries, observed that it is 
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“practically impossible for troops not to violate human rights in conflict situations to 
protect the national security of the country” (p. 86). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed important repercussions of British colonialism on 
the Indian sub-continent, especially the Partition of the Indian-subcontinent, and the 
ripple effects on minoritized groups. The ripple effect of colonialism was the creation of 
Bangladesh as an independent state, and in turn how it feared the Jummas’ self-
determination movement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. This is the larger context for the 
present-day conflicts around tourism in the area are.  
It was the large displacement of people prescribed by the Partition that laid the 
basis for ethnic conflicts in all parts of South Asia including Bangladesh. Military 
occupation of the Hills, and other parts of the region where indigenous people historically 
had customary ownership of land were outcomes of British colonization, categorization 
into identity-based groups, and Partition. This military occupation and ethnic domination 
in the Hills have rendered the Jummas as the suspicious ‘others’ on the one hand, and as 
exotic commodities for consumption on the other. 
In the next chapter, I explore military occupation in the Hills in order to illustrate 
how militarization is wielded as a political and economic tool to support state control of 
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the Jumma population and how this is experienced by the Jummas and how it normalizes 
violence. 
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Chapter 3: Everyday Military Occupation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
In this chapter I discuss how the state consolidates its power by cultivating a 
culture of fear and violence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The expansion of state power 
emerged in the form of military-controlled tourism in the Hills with ruinous effects on the 
indigenous inhabitants of the region. I hope to illustrate how militarization is wielded as a 
political and economic tool to support state control of the Jumma population through 
tourism. Militarization is experienced by the Jummas as a form of state violence and 
remains a symbolic dominating tool that defines Bengali-Jumma relations, constructs the 
idea of an ‘ethnic conflict’ and normalizes violence. I am looking at militarization from 
the standpoint of the occupied Jummas but also exploring the forms of resistance and 
challenges to everyday militarization. Military presence has very different consequences 
for dominant and subjugated peoples. Militarization has historically been part of imperial 
conquest and settler colonization; in the case of the Hills internal colonization has been 
realized through Bengali settlers at the expense of the land belonging to the Jummas. 
The Reality of Everyday Military Occupation in the Hills 
My first exposure to the level of militarization and surveillance in the Hills was in 
February 2009 when I was a journalist and went to the area as a translator for a fact-
finding visit for the advocacy body, the CHT Commission. It was known that the 
Commission’s mandate was to report on the human rights violations and the Hills were 
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on high alert. At the entrance to each of the three hill districts, the vehicle carrying us had 
to be registered and the foreign members of the Commission had to show their passports 
and register their names. Most Bengalis like myself living outside the Hills are unaware 
of the sharp contrast of living under military occupation as opposed to living under a civil 
administration in the rest of Bangladesh. When middle-class Bengalis do visit the area, 
they visit as tourists and their major concern is their own safety and thus they accept this 
militarization as a necessary tool to control the nation’s Others on this frontier region and 
accept the meta-narrative of preserving Bangladesh’s sovereignty. The state promotes the 
idea that despite the presence of ‘terrorists’, it is capable of keeping the area ‘safe’ and 
‘peaceful’ for tourism. 
 
Figure 1: A military checkpoint in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts. 
Photo: Author, 2009. 
At each of our meetings during that fact-
finding visit we were surrounded by military intelligence officials and the local 
government administrators, laboriously taking notes. We were interviewing Jumma 
villagers who had lost their land or faced violence from Bengali settler groups or by the 
security forces and had failed to receive justice from the system. We had to repeatedly 
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tell the intelligence agents to leave our meeting rooms. This didn’t seem to make the local 
administration very happy. Of course, this was a high-level, international, fact-finding 
team which was specifically there to make a report on allegations of land-grabbing and 
human rights violations, so the level of surveillance was very high. 
I soon found out that surveillance is normalized even during cultural events 
including Jumma festivals and public gathering. Democratic practices are suspended for 
the Jummas, and even the police sometimes have very little authority over what happens 
here. This I noticed two months after my first visit when I went to Khagrachari again. 
This time I went there with my four-year-old son and a friend to see the Biju Festival 
(Chakma New Year celebration), the biggest cultural festival of the Chakmas. The other 
Jumma communities also celebrate the New Year on the same day, although under 
different names. 
Our friend Samari Chakma welcomed us into her home in Mohajanpara and told 
us we should be prepared for any possible incidents. Although the Biju Festival (around 
April 13) is strictly a cultural festival, Jummas remain on very high alert during the time 
as there have been many incidents of violence during festivals. The presence of random 
plainclothes intelligence officials throughout Khagrachari town during the two days we 
spent there clearly spoke of this tension. But we were lucky. This was 2009 and we were 
at least able to use our cellphones then. For ten years since the country came under 
nationwide cell phone coverage, it remained inaccessible in the Hills. The military 
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considered cell phone communication a ‘security threat’ to the area. Finally, in 2008, 
ironically under a two-year military-backed caretaker government and a state of 
emergency in the entire country, the government decided to open the area for cell phone 
coverage. The state of emergency was a testing time for the people of the country. Samari 
had laughed at us at the time saying that Bengalis were finally able to understand in those 
two years what it was like to live under military occupation. 
Fast-forward to 2016 and I arrive in Sajek in August 2016 to find out about 
tourism under military occupation for my MA thesis. My companion, anthropologist 
Rahnuma Ahmed and I were held up at the military checkpoint for some time. At 
checkpoints the military registers each person and vehicles that go through. I gave my 
name to Bablu, our companion and along with Mintu, the driver, they went up to the 
checkpoint. A few minutes later Bablu came back and said that the officers wanted to 
speak to us. We soon learned why they wanted to talk to us directly instead of just taking 
down a name. 
“Are you deshi [local] or bideshi [foreign]?” asked the officer in charge at the military 
checkpoint. 
“We are Bangladeshi,” Rahnuma said to the officer. 
“They said you are bideshi,” responded the officer pointing to the three Jumma men, 
including the driver, who were accompanying us in the car. There were about ten military 
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officers visible at the checkpoint. The officer sitting next to the one questioning us began 
to fiddle with his rifle. 
“So where will you be staying?” the officer asked. 
“At the ROCK Sajek,” I answered. 
“Why are you staying at the Rock Paradise?” he asked, “it’s outside our protection zone.” 
“No no, we’re not staying at the Rock Paradise, we’re staying at the ROCK Sajek, it’s 
owned by you [the military], it’s the Regional Officers Club Khagrachari.” 
“Did you make a booking there?” 
“Yes of course.” 
“Why did you two women come here? Why didn’t you bring a man with you?” 
“We go around the world on our own, shouldn’t we be able to visit our country on our 
own?” laughed Rahnuma. 
“Yes, but you have to understand that the situation of this area is dangerous and this place 
is full of terrorists. Anything can happen to you.” 
I wondered if the officer was aware of the meaning and contradiction of what he 
had just said. I had a number of questions going through my mind. If the military feels 
that this is a dangerous area why is the state promoting it as a ‘paradise’ for tourists? 
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Who are these terrorists and how are their activities characterized as ‘terrorism’? In a 
region where an overwhelming percentage of gender-based violence are carried out 
against poor Jumma women by either Bengali men or the security forces with impunity, 
what specifically was the source of threat to us as women with ethnic and class privilege? 
But that was not the place for delving into such political discussions. The military 
officer’s casual use of the term ‘terrorist’ was not new. The military categorically refer to 
Jumma activists as ‘terrorists’. It was not too long ago when Bengalis who were fighting 
against Pakistani oppression were labelled ‘terrorists’ and ‘traitors’ in the Pakistani 
nationalist narrative, while in Bangladesh those same people were ‘freedom fighters’. Not 
only does it not require a second thought for such terms to be expressed so casually, two 
of the largest newspapers of the country lost 25 percent of their advertising revenue 
overnight when they referred to Jumma activists shot dead by the military as ‘indigenous’ 
men instead of ‘terrorists’ (Bergman, 2015). Visweswaran (2013) points out that states 
founded on democratic revolutions, once themselves labeled terrorist by colonial regimes, 
use the term ‘terrorism’ to discredit and delegitimize the struggles for self-determination. 
For the Jummas, however, it was the new nation-state’s categorical oppression and 
marginalization that provoked and intensified their resistance. Falk (2013) argues that 
occupiers use the language of ‘terrorism’ to delegitimize resistance movements by the 
occupied while legitimizing their own violence and security operations. Although Falk 
was writing about Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, the same applies to 
Bangladeshi authorities who use the same language, wherein the terrorist (the military 
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and state police) become victims, and the victims resisting occupation are linguistically 
inverted into terrorists. 
During our journey to Sajek we observed that most of the other tourists were 
young people in their late 20s and 30s, university students or young professionals, from 
Dhaka. There were only a few families with young children. The element of ethnic 
tension in the area makes for a tourist spot geared for the young, urban, adventurous 
professionals, rather than a relaxing family getaway. Whether it was the regular level of 
surveillance in Sajek or whether it was because Rahnuma and I were an anomaly in terms 
of the regular Sajek tourist profile we had to face further queries in the coming days of 
our stay there. 
On the first night of our stay at ROCK Sajek hotel, when the two of us were 
having dinner at the restaurant of the hotel, an army officer came up to us and asked us if 
they could take our photos. He had been asked to send our photos to the ‘headquarters’, 
he said. I was not prepared for this and looked at Rahnuma. “Yes, of course,” Rahnuma 
responded to the army officer immediately and smiled. The silent Jumma man standing 
by with the camera next to the army officer pointed it at us and took a couple of pictures 
and then went away. Later the next day, Rahnuma had to face more questions by three 
army officers who were sitting by the army canteen. The questions were personal - where 
was her village home, where in Dhaka did she live, where was her husband and what did 
he do, etc. 
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Questioning by the military may have seemed intrusive to us Dhaka-centred 
Bengalis, but for Jummas interrogating and questioning are normalized or part of their 
daily experience. When speaking to Mikel Chakma about this he had in fact informed me 
that he had been to jail so many times that he had trained himself to cope and survive in 
captivity. Visweswaran (2013) argues that an occupying power rarely refers to itself as 
such and Bangladesh is no exception. In the official state national narrative there is no 
acknowledgement that the Jummas have been living under military occupation since the 
late 1970s when the army was deployed there under the military dictatorship to quell 
Jumma dissent. Three days before returning to Canada, I met with a Jumma activist who 
remains underground for security purposes. He was one of those who opposed the CHT 
Accord, which he said had watered down all the demands of the Jummas and hence had 
compromised the cause of the movement for self-determination. He talked about the 
exclusionary nationalism that defines the role of the military in the Hills: 
Why do we need the military to guard a village? In fact, you don’t even need the 
police, you can have the community police do the work. The state does not need 
to spend so much money on the military, there are many other important things 
that they can spend it on. They should spend the money on the service sector. By 
spending so much on the military in the Hills they are simply instigating a very 
violent nationalistic feeling which goes against us. 
[Fieldwork, September 2016, translated from Bangla by author] 
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However, the military never withdrew or reduced their presence after the 
symbolic ‘Peace’ Accord was signed which promised to effectively demilitarize the area. 
The Accord besides ensuring a form of autonomy says this about military presence in the 
area: 
After signing the agreement between the government and the Jana Samhati Samiti 
and immediately after the return of the JSS members to normal life all the 
temporary camps of military, Ansar and Village Defence Party shall be taken 
back to permanent installations except the Border Security Force (BDR) and 
permanent cantonments by phases and with this in view, time limit shall be 
determined. [Section 17, 1997 CHT Accord] 
Aside from a few highly publicized actions to dismantle some temporary military 
camps, the overall public presence of the military has remained the same over the years 
(IWGIA 2012). Siddiqui (2017) argues that the Accord has invisibilized the militarization 
of everyday life ‘post-conflict’ and is used as a justification for “constant surveillance, an 
environment of fear, intimidation and self-censorship, and little prospect of justice” (p. 
229). A UN Special Rapporteur in 2011 noted that a majority of human rights violations 
committed against indigenous peoples in the region could be attributed to the extensive 
presence of security forces and the military’s influence on the civil administration in the 
area (UNPFII, 2011). Mong Shanoo Chowdhury, who is based in Rangamati is a member 
of the CHT Citizens’ Committee said this about military presence: 
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Why is there so much security all around us now with six different cantonments? 
The CHT seems to be a field training ground for the military to help them to serve 
in UN peacekeeping. We have an army firing artillery range and the air force 
firing range to support field training. If they accept the terms of the CHT Accord 
they will have to close all this, so how will they train for peacekeeping if they 
don’t have all this? 
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla by author] 
It is said that one-third of the total military personnel of the country are deployed 
in the Hills (IWGIA, 2012). Given that the Hills are more thinly populated than the rest 
of the country, this makes for a very strong and disproportionate military presence. The 
IWGIA report estimates 35,000 to 40,000 out of a total of 120,000 military personnel are 
deployed in the Hills. Another 10,000 personnel from the Border Guards Bangladesh 
(BGB), and 10,000 Ansar and Armed Police Battalions (APBn) paramilitary personnel 
are also deployed in the area (IWGIA, 2012). There is no official government statistic on 
this as information related to the military is protected by the state. There are six military 
cantonments in the three districts of the Hills while there are only 14 cantonments in the 
remaining 61 districts of the country. Similar occupations exist in other parts of the sub-
continent including Kashmir and the Indian North-East (Visweswaran, 2013). Junaid’s 
(2013) research on Indian-occupied Kashmir argues for the importance of demystifying 
occupation’s self-image as a state’s magnanimity and capture its actual self as an 
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occupying power. Occupation in postcolonial states is wielded as a political and 
economic tool and is experienced as a material form of violence and symbolic 
domination (Visweswaran, 2013). Nur Khan, a Bengali activist and an Executive Director 
of human rights organization, Ain O Salish Kendro, had this to say about the reality of 
everyday militarization in the Hills: 
The presence of the military in the Hills is overwhelming. They are present within 
10 to 20 yards of a village home sometimes. And these military officers are 
constantly keeping watch near places where people are going about their daily 
activities, women are doing their housework or simply taking a bath. As a result, 
their normal life, their normal daily activities are being severely affected as a 
result. There is a breakdown of their normal life because of their [military] 
presence. Military establishments or any kind of establishments related to the 
security forces always try to create fear in society. It’s only by creating fear 
within the society that you can repress a society. This effort is always quite visible 
in the Hills. 
[Fieldwork, August 2016, translated from Bangla by author] 
Ahmed (2017) points out that the army suppresses protests against torture and 
violence by increasing checkpoints in the area. In response to the killing of a Chakma 
activist in 2017 there have been reports of banners being snatched away, posters torn off, 
people have been physically restricted from attending a memorial meeting for the man, 
  
88 
 
teams going from Dhaka to investigate the death have been turned away by the army. 
“Military rule in the CHT is racialised, only paharis are stopped, prevented, persecuted 
and harassed, while Bengalis are allowed to go their way peacefully” (Ahmed, 2017). 
Despite information widely circulated in social media about the case and a 
complaint to the National Human Rights Commission from Romel’s father, it wasn’t 
until his dead body surfaced that the national media reported it (Ahmed, I 2017). Social 
media has become the vehicle for carrying news and analysis about the Hills and other 
‘sensitive’ national issues in contrast to mainstream media. Journalist Ikhtisad Ahmed 
(2017) writes: 
Evidently, dissent is unbecoming of Bangladeshis. Protests are, therefore, 
suppressed as a matter of national duty. When the army desecrated temples in 
Naniachar on May 18 and severely injured several people in the subsequent 
protests on May 22, there were no media reports. 
Ahmed (2017) refers to a number of violent acts in the Hills that were ignored by 
the media or reported in a biased manner. A Facebook post by a Tripura activist about the 
attacks in Longodu in June 2017 illustrates this distrust further: 
I am reconfirming, I don't trust Bangladesh mainstream newspaper on Indigenous 
Peoples issue! And in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region, media is controlled by 
the Bangladesh Army. Most of the journalists (except two or three) in the CHT, 
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don't have strong moral and ethical position, they are inhuman and backboneless. 
They don't go for the real fact when write a report for the news, but they are good 
making own (false) story like making a chicken curry with ingredients! 
 [Original Facebook post, June 2017] 
Media Repression of Military Violations 
Media bias is not new in the Hills. During the 1980s there was an almost media 
blackout in the region. The military government restricted movement of journalists in the 
area. Many had to secretly go into the area to do their reports. There is limited 
information about the scale of killings during that time. Many local journalists operate in 
the area but they do not have the freedom to report about the state-supported violence 
there. They receive regular instructions to adhere to the military narrative through what is 
euphemized as cha-er dawat (tea invitations) by military officials, or regular briefing 
sessions given to the local journalists outlining what may or may not be reported 
(Ahmed, 2013). A confidential military document labeled the Strategic Management 
Forum (Adnan 2010) in 2010 had explicitly stated the military’s intention of keeping the 
media under control, incidentally also couched in the language of ‘objectivity’: 
Print and electronic media may be advised to be more objective in their portrayal 
of the CHT and the security forces, especially in critical situations. If necessary, 
civil administration as government spokesperson, in coordination with security 
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forces, may arrange Press Briefing against regional parties’ propaganda. As the 
CHT is a ‘Special Region’, the issue of proper role of media on security issues of 
the region may be incorporated in the media policy of the impending national 
defence policy. 
 [Translated from original memo from the Armed Forces Division] 
In 2015, the military also shot and killed five Jumma activists belonging to the 
splinter group of the PCJSS. As soon as the two largest daily newspapers wrote about this 
killing, the security discourse was ignited once again, blaming the victims for their own 
fate instead of taking the said military officers to task. The military sent official 
complaints to the newspapers stating that the dead should have been identified as 
‘terrorists’ instead of ‘indigenous men’. When the newspapers did not accede to their 
instructions the military asked all foreign-owned corporations to stop advertising in the 
two newspapers. Since then, the two newspapers lost more than a fourth of their 
advertising revenue (Bergman, 2015). 
In 2015, Bangladeshi indigenous filmmaker Aung Rakhine unveiled the first 
feature film made in the Chakma language about the community from the Chittagong Hill 
Tracts (CHT). The Bangladesh Film Censor Board (BFCD) refused clearance to the film 
as a result of which the film could not be shown in public halls inside the country 
although it was shown at various overseas film festivals and won critical acclaim (Reza, 
2015). The censor board claimed that it was only authorized to give clearance to films 
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made in Bangla, the state language according to the national constitution of the country. 
Apart from the technicality cited by the censor board, the Ministry of Information of the 
Government of Bangladesh also made a formal objection about the film’s content saying 
that the film had “…visuals and dialogue which were defamatory to the security forces 
and the Government of Bangladesh”, and which was “part of the propaganda against the 
military in the CHT” (Letter from Information Ministry 2015, June 29).  The film is 
about a poor Chakma villager and how he uses his bicycle to earn a living after losing his 
job in the city. The visual in question is about 10 seconds long within the one-hour-long 
film. It shows the boots of (Bangladeshi) military officers passing through the house of 
the Chakma man. While passing through the courtyard of his house the boots are seen 
crushing the toys of the man’s young son while the man gets down on his knees in fear to 
show respect to the military officers. 
Such symbolic scenes of military violence have been depicted many times in 
many Bangladeshi films. However, those films have been accepted and many have 
received national acclaim because in most Bangladeshi films the military perpetrators are 
Pakistani soldiers and the victims are Bengali. These depictions fit perfectly into the 
acceptable national narrative and in fact is helped to further reinforce it. Rakhine’s film 
on the other hand disturbs this narrative tremendously. In ten seconds Rakhine managed 
to stir up a part of Bangladesh’s history that for decades the state has tried hard to keep 
out of the narrative, and to ensure it is not discussed publicly or brought into media focus.  
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Evictions from Land and Legal Obfuscations  
In April 2017 a group of activists, journalists and a politician were barred from 
entering Bandarban's Lama upazila when the 14-member team went to investigate the 
eviction of Jumma villagers from their ancestral land. The military officers cited security 
reasons and prevented the group from going to Lama, saying that there were instructions 
from the ‘higher authorities’. The group was later also refused permission to hold a press 
conference in Bandarban and meet the district’s Deputy Commissioner (The Daily Star, 
2017). 
Land acquisition has been a major focus of state occupation of the Hills from the 
1970s. Adnan (2010) observes that the armed forces and the local administration in 
collusion with political elites have been acquiring common and private land of the 
Jummas to expand their economic projects and establishments. Due to the state of legal 
pluralism in the Hills there coexists a parallel operation of three major types of land laws 
which overlap and thus creates conflicting claims on the same plot of land (Adnan, 2010). 
This situation creates vast opportunities for corrupt officials and the political elite. The 
CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation (1958) is a particularly draconian law which 
authorises the Deputy Commissioner to acquire and land in the Hills without giving prior 
notice to the inhabitants (Adnan, 2010; Roy, 2000). The Bangladesh military, border 
guards and other state authorities have already acquired thousands of acres of land 
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without proper legal mechanisms using this law (Adnan, 2010; Chakma & Tripura, 
2010). 
The struggle between the armed forces and the Jummas over land often results in 
forced evictions of the Jummas in the Hills. The Deputy Commissioners in the three 
districts have been leasing out lands for industrial plants and commercial plantations to 
powerful private companies (Adnan & Dastidar 2010). Swagatam Chakma, whose family 
was evicted from their lands, and who is now a writer based in Dhaka said this to me 
when I interviewed him: 
During 1982-83 all the land belonging to my family was taken away from us by 
settlers. I had to change my school at least eight to ten times before I sat for my 
matriculation exams [secondary school certificate exams]. Every time the settlers 
came in we became internally displaced. Most people would drop out of school if 
they went through what I did. But I finished my masters simply because I was too 
obstinate. Land is the main source of self-identification for Jummas. Land also 
influences cultural development but having the land taken away from us has also 
prevented us from the natural development of our culture. 
 [Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla by author] 
From 1979 to 2010, at least 40,000 acres of land were acquired by Bengali elites 
and the military as plantation leases in the Bandarban district along (Adnan, 2010; 
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Chakma & Hill, 2013). Levene (1999) characterized the Bangladesh military’s operations 
in the Hills as a “creeping genocide” and pointed out that new nation-states often resort to 
violence in unoccupied, resource-rich frontier regions in order to overcome their 
structural weaknesses. The fear of possible eviction from their lands without any due 
process looms large in the everyday lives of Jumma peoples. Green’s (1999) research in 
Guatemala following the Guatemalan civil war notes how violence and fear permeated 
through people’s everyday lives in the post counter-insurgency militarized situation and 
how this is not always perceptible to those outside. In the Hills, the appearance of 
military checkpoints, army garrisons, and civil patrols despite being visible to outsiders, 
has been normalized. In fact, Jummas often compare their situation to the Palestinians 
under Israeli occupation, where checkpoint and armed soldiers permeate the landscape.  It 
is not until an attack of large proportions takes place that the silenced tension erupts in 
public. In the Hills, it is fear that is used as counterinsurgency strategy which has turned 
the area into a permanent state of silencing and tension. Sa’di and Abu-Lughod (2007) 
points out how between 1948 and 1966 checkpoints have been put in place for the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel in order to severely restrict their movement which “was 
epitomized by the ubiquity of ever more elaborate checkpoints” (p. 16). 
The Politics of Everyday Occupation 
I went to Khagrachari in July 2016 for a quick visit to conduct some interviews 
before my planned trip to Sajek the following month and was reminded of the difficulties 
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of doing research under the circumstances. After interviewing Samari, I interviewed 
Proshanto Chakma and Rashed Rahman (pseudonyms), two young university students 
who had also visited various tourist areas and wanted to talk to me about it. I had met 
Proshanto and his younger brother Shushanto about five years earlier. They were cousins 
of a former Chakma colleague of mine. At that time, I had read a very beautifully written 
Bangla essay by Shushanto for his fifth-grade assignment where he wrote about how he 
spent Eid day with his family in prayers and food. Not an unusual essay topic for a fifth 
grader. However, the irony of that was of course that Shushanto’s family is Buddhist and 
they neither pray nor celebrate Eid in their family. Beyond the violence, intimidation and 
overt fear propagated through the armed state institutions, occupation also takes place in 
the Hills through the informal means.  
Although a student of chemistry at university, Proshanto had become a prolific 
blogger over the years. He had written some powerful blog posts about his experiences in 
his visits to some tourist spots. He and Rashed were not comfortable with being recorded 
but agreed to be interviewed, so I took notes. The information they provided to me were 
anecdotal and mostly focused on Bandarban, where both the level of surveillance and the 
frequency of Bengali tourists is much higher, making fieldwork much more difficult to 
conduct. 
After talking to the two, Proshanto informed me that his mother who was a school 
teacher had invited me to have dinner with them that night. However, Samari was not too 
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keen about this. She warned both of us that this was not a good idea under the 
circumstances of heightened surveillance, the attack on me and the overall political 
situation. As I was a guest at her house and a Bengali she also felt more concerned about 
my security. If something happened to me and the authorities found out I was staying at 
her house, the blame would fall directly on her and the Jumma political groups. She told 
me that her father had warned her about letting her Bengali friends stay at her house 
knowing how stories are spinned against Jummas. She had jokingly said that she always 
asks her Bengali friends to sign a notarized document before coming to her house, so that 
she is not held accountable for what happens to them. Green (1999) argues that fear 
rather than being solely a subjective personal experience has also penetrated the social 
memory and is a chronic condition where social relations are destabilized and creates 
suspicion and apprehension not only of strangers but of each other. The memory of the 
violence “gets deeply inscribed into individual bodies and the collective imagination 
through a constant sense of threat” (p. 55). 
In the Hills disappearances and filing of false cases against activists and 
community organizers is a common threat and carried out quite often. This is quite 
common throughout Bangladesh. According to human rights organization Ain O Salish 
Kendro, at least 284 persons (mostly activists and opposition party sympathizers) 
‘disappeared’ throughout the country between 2014 and 2017 (Prothom Alo, 2017). In 
August 2016, I met Kobita (name changed) of the Sajek Nari Samaj (Sajek Women’s 
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Society) who was recently attacked by unknown assailants. The Massalong Police Station 
filed a case against her for obstructing government’s work; as she explained: 
I have to give hajira [court attendance] every month. False cases are just a way to 
harass us and stop us from protesting the wrongs of the government. If I don’t 
give hajira they will issue a warrant against me and arrest me and they can do this 
anytime they want. I don’t know why I was attacked but I know that the 
administration does not think very well of me. They don’t have a good view of me 
because I’m involved with the movement and I have always said I am not 
involved with the movement for the sake of it but rather the movement is the only 
way I know for my own protection. I don’t want to hurt anyone or kill anyone in 
the government. I’m a woman and for my own survival I have to be part of this 
movement. Sajek Nari Samaj hasn’t been able to do their work for a long time. 
The military is always trying to intimidate us in various ways. They are doing 
blank fires from the zone all the time to keep us in fear. 
Kobita could not talk to me for too long. She was clearly still traumatized from 
the attack. She wore a hat to cover her stitched and shaved head which she had from the 
injury to her head. She feared for her life, she said, but also wanted to tell me her story. 
The Sajek Nari Samaj had been very active in protesting army atrocities in Sajek since 
2008 when the houses of Jummas were burned down and the following harassment by the 
military of common villagers. During this time, a number of male villagers were picked 
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up and confined by the military. Women also played their part, they got together and 
resisted the aggression by the military. Despite the history of rape and sexual assault by 
the military during the armed conflict throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Jumma women 
have always put up a resistance to this violence.  
 
Figure 2: Women villagers in Sajek 
confronting a military vehicle in 2010 
following an arson attack in their 
villages. 
Photo: Jumma activist, 2010. 
In 1983 a secret memorandum was circulated to army officers from the top 
authorities which encouraged them to marry Jumma women as a counter-insurgency 
mechanism (Chakma & Hill, 2013; Guhathakurta, 2001; CHT Commission, 1991). 
During Bangladesh’s independence war Pakistani soldiers were also instructed to 
impregnate Bengali women. The idea was to produce a generation of children who would 
be loyal to Pakistan (D’Costa, 2011). As a result, between 200,000 and 400,000 women 
were raped and made sex slaves in Pakistani military camps during the nine months of 
Bangladesh’s war of independence (Islam, 2012; D’Costa, 2011; Mookherjee, 2006). 
Here too the Bangladesh military seem to have emulated the Pakistan army which 
colonized and persecuted the bodies of Bengalis. There are accounts of military officers 
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going into schools and parading young Jumma girls in front of them in order to pick them 
for marriage (Chakma & Hill, 2013). Many Jumma women who were forcibly married to 
Bengalis reported that they were forced to convert to Islam (D’Costa, 2014). Forced 
marriages is the literal occupation of indigenous women’s bodies (Siddiqi, 2017) and 
seen as a means to assimilate them into Muslim Bengali society; this practice has been 
used as a counter-insurgency measure and part and parcel of the darker side of nation-
building in Bangladesh. One of my interviewees, Dawnai Prue Naly, from the Bohmong 
royal family of Bandarban said this about herself being forcibly married to an army 
officer: 
I was part of an army family. When the military came here they took a strategic 
decision to make a bride out of a girl from the royal family. They had their eyes 
on me from when I was in seventh grade. And when I was in ninth grade they 
took me away and got me married to one of them. At that age I didn’t even know 
what marriage was. They took me away from my house and forced me to get 
married to him. Until I gave birth to my daughter I really didn’t understand what 
marriage was. I was only 16 years old when I had a baby and I stayed in the 
marriage for 10 years. I still find it difficult to recall the circumstances under 
which I was forced to get married. They asked me to say kobul and I told them, 
will you let me go if I say kobul? They said they would and so I said kobul three 
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times.1 But they refused to let me go after that and they told me, now you are the 
wife of an army officer, you have to stay with him. And when I was 23 years old 
and the mother of two children, he abandoned me. Since I had been married to a 
Bengali man my society refused to accept me after that. 
Through an analysis of military memoirs in the context of Bangladesh’s war of 
independence D’Costa (2014b) argues that control of the bodies of women and religious 
minorities has played an important role in post-colonial nation-building and colonial 
categorizations of difference contributed to the racial and gendered construction of 
stereotypes resulting in militarized performances of masculinity. Ironically, while 
D’Costa writes about this in the context of the Bengali women victims, after 1971 the 
Bengali military was very swift to embrace the role of the perpetrators against Jumma 
women. Visweswaran (2013) argues that it is important to focus on the temporalities of 
violence, which in the case of military presence and everyday surveillance is a 
routinization and systemization of occupation. In the case of the Hills the expansion and 
consolidation of military presence from the barracks to tourist resorts is an example of 
this systematic expansion of this occupation. 
Chakma and Hill (2013) perceive the military occupation in the Hills as a form of 
internal colonization. Although some scholars restrict the idea of colonization as 
occupation of a foreign land, many assert that the concept has just as much relevance in 
                                                 
1 Saying kobul is an acceptance of marriage in Islam. 
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describing land within a state which has a different political and administrative history 
and different ethnic demography, languages, cultures, and religions, and subjected to 
occupation or colonization. In the case of the Hills, the ideological framing of this 
colonization is Muslim-Bengali nationalism (Chakma & Hill 2013). Siddiqi (2017) also 
talks about the normalization of militarism through domination and colonization: 
“So it is that the material violence and symbolic domination of everyday life in 
the CHT are recast as matters of territorial and cultural integrity, economic 
development, and national security. Narratives of militarism and counter-
insurgency, interwoven with discourses of development and ecological 
sustainability, reproduce the CHT as a troubled space that must be tamed; they 
also serve to erase relations of power between Bengalis and others (p. 226).” 
Sexual violence against Jumma women led many Jummas to relocate from their 
homes and lands and seek shelter elsewhere including into neighboring India, thereby 
causing many Jumma people to lose their ancestral homes during the armed conflict. But 
the sexual violence and impunity by Bengali settlers have continued well beyond the 
signing of the CHT Accord and into the present day. In a disturbing trend, medical 
practitioners are also complicit in obstructing justice. A number of incidents illustrate that 
in the Hills rape of Jumma women are negated by doctors and medical officers refusing 
to give an honest medical report in fear of unleashing communal violence and 
maintaining good relations between Bengalis and Indigenous people (Chakma, 2014). 
  
102 
 
Communal oppression, impunity of perpetrators, a non-cooperative legal system and a 
weak traditional justice system, along with land-grabbing hinders access to justice in the 
Hills (D’Costa, 2014). Visweswaran (2013) posits that many powers which claim to be 
democracies, unleash large-scale military campaigns and wars, thereby contradicting 
their claims to democracy, for example the US-led occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the occupation of Palestine by the state of Israel, and the military occupation of Kashmir 
and the Northeastern India. It is difficult to assess the occupation of the Hills in numerical 
terms as information about the military is concealed from the public and cannot be 
accessed even with the Right to Information Act of Bangladesh. This also provides 
impunity to individual military personnel from being convicted of human rights 
violations. 
From its first beginnings, the self-determination movement of the Jummas has 
been treated as an insurgency movement, and the state’s response has been 
counterinsurgency before and after the CHT Accord of 1997. The mass population 
transfer of poor and landless Bengalis, Operation Uttoron and random searches for 
‘insurgents’ have been carried out since the 1970s. The CHT Accord did not hinder the 
state from counterinsurgency operations in the Hills, which today involves regular 
intimidation and random house searches, especially of homes belonging to Jummas. 
Filing of false cases and framing charges against Jummas, physical torture and political 
harassment has continued unabated. Writing on Kashmir, Junaid (2013) suggests that 
occupation can be better understood as possessing ‘‘general features’’ or practices such 
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as the ‘‘physical organization of space, uses of violence, procedures of security, 
emergency laws and ordinances, tactical decisions and moves among higher and lower 
level figures in power, psychological operations and propaganda” (p. 162)  which, while 
specific to Kashmir, also resonate with other places under occupation.  
In May 2017, a Buddhist monastery in Rangamati was vandalized by the military 
(PCJSS, Email newsletter, 2017, May 27). When the locals staged a demonstration 
against this act and were on their way to submit a complaint addressed to the Prime 
Minister a few days after the attack, they were further attacked by the local military 
officers wounding several people and taking three activists into custody (PCJSS, Email 
newsletter, 2017, May 27). 
Part of the counterinsurgency operations also made the Hills a place for 
disciplining government officers. The place became known as a ‘punishment zone’ as it 
was considered isolated from the rest of the country where an armed conflict was going 
on with antagonism towards Bengali government officials. It is also known to have a high 
power-outage rate and infestation of malarial mosquitoes. This is perhaps another raging 
contradiction where the state portrays the region both as a ‘punishment zone’ and a 
‘paradise’ at the same time. The ‘punishment zone’ has another sinister side to it. In 
February 2017, a police officer who had been caught on video having taken part in 
burning homes of Santal (plainland indigenous Hindu community of Bangladesh) 
villages, was transferred from that area into the Khagrachari district after the High Court 
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asked for his withdrawal from Gaibandha (a district in the northern part of Bangladesh 
under Rangpur Division) in connection to the arson attack only three months before, in 
November 2016. A government official in uniform who publicly carried out acts of 
violence against an indigenous community instead of being held accountable for his acts 
was placed in an area with a larger indigenous population where conflicts were more 
frequent. The transfer was stopped following a protest from human rights activists in 
Dhaka. In May 2017, three more police officers, who were held for making up a false 
case against a dead man and a toddler, were also ‘demoted’ and ‘punished’ by being 
posted in the Khagrachari Armed Police Battalion (The Daily Star 2017, May 14). 
Following the 2010 arson attack in Sajek, the Armed Forces Division under the 
Prime Minister’s Office developed a ‘Strategic Management Forum’ (Adnan, 2010; 
IWGIA, 2012). Apart from plans to rehabilitate the families who had lost their homes 
through a collaboration between the military authorities and the Ministry of CHT Affairs, 
it also proposed to heighten the surveillance in the area by coordinating activities of all 
intelligence agencies in the CHT, including the Director General of Forces Intelligence 
(DGFI), the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the District Special Branch (DSB), 
under 24 Infantry Division, which would “have a huge impact on attaining the targets of 
Operation Uttoron” and this would be done through setting up of a Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Intelligence Committee (CHTIC) at divisional level and by Regional Intelligence 
Committee (RIC) at regional or brigade level. The implementation body for the 
surveillance would be the Home Ministry and the Armed Forces. Under the Strategic 
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Management Forum, the military also decided to take up road construction projects in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Communication and the Ministry Of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Affairs (MOCHTA). The military also proposed to expand its Engineering 
Construction Battalion. By controlling the activities of the UPDF the military also set up 
a way of silencing protest, dissent, and the democratic rights of civil disobedience. They 
also sought to have more control over the Forest Department. The military sought to 
control the work of the CHT Commission, UNDP and other NGOs directly by the Armed 
Forces. All this indicated that following the arson attack in Sajek in 2010 the military 
sought to increase its overall regulation over the policy decisions affecting the region. 
Referring to the Strategic Management Forum Adnan (2010) argues: 
Reports in the national press suggest the existence of an alternative blueprint to 
the CHT Accord for reorganizing the political and administrative structure of this 
region, linking development explicitly with security concerns, engineering politics 
to squeeze out regional Pahari parties, and bringing under surveillance what the 
media can publicly report about these developments. (p. 31) 
In March 2015, the Ministry for Home Affairs issued a public order which 
prohibited Jumma people from speaking with anyone from outside the CHT, including 
Bangladeshi citizens, without the presence of government or military officials (Siddiqi 
2017). This order also heightened surveillance on foreigners, lengthening the time period 
of clearance for entry by the intelligence agency to a month. There is no similar clearance 
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required for foreigners to work in any other part of the country. Not only was it a 
discriminatory order, it was a blatant attempt to silence Jumma resistance and 
institutionalize racial/spatial hierarchies (Siddiqi, 2017). This was a continuation of the 
discriminatory orders issued from different government offices including the Home 
Ministry. There have been orders from the government to local hill district officials 
prohibiting them from taking part in indigenous day celebrations, there have been orders 
to organizations operating in the Hills to employ 50 percent Bengalis and also to include 
50 percent Bengalis as beneficiaries of any projects. All this is clearly part of the 
counterinsurgency program ‘Operation Uttoron’ under the military leadership in the 
Hills. 
The kind of open and accepted form of discrimination towards citizens of a 
country has a colonial history in the premises of the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 and 
1911. This is a colonial construct (Nigam, 1990; Devi, 1995) made into a law passed by 
the British colonial government identifying certain Indians based on their religion and 
caste as being 'habitually criminal' and restrictions being placed on their movements with 
mandatory and regular police reporting. Nadim explains that in their efforts at knowledge 
production the British “reduced the natives to their racial essences” so that these groups 
could be policed, suppressed and controlled. Referring to the Criminal Tribes Act and its 
parallel with the present situation in the Hills, Khan (2017) argues that the criminalisation 
of activities of Jummas results in arbitrary arrests, detention and intimidation of them. 
She further adds: 
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If one can understand the use of criminalisation as a strategy to manage resistance 
by colonialists in the Third World, then it is appropriate to make the leap to see 
how this tactic could be effective when used by the post-colonial state against 
groups of people that are considered on the margins rather than centre stage in the 
narrative regarding nationhood.  
Resistance to Military Occupation 
In April 2017, Romel Chakma, a 20-year-old visually impaired college student 
and a member of the Pahari Chhatra Parishad (Hill Students Council), otherwise known 
as PCP, the student wing of United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) was taken into 
custody by the military in Rangamati. While in army custody he was brutally tortured and 
killed (Ahmed 2017, May 14). The police informed the media that there were no 
allegations against Romel and the military tried to hand over Romel’s body to the police 
but when the police saw the condition of his body they refused to receive it. In order to 
hide the torture marks, the military burned the body of Romel Chakma and called it a 
‘cremation’. As Ahmed (2017, May 18) points out: 
History has proven, time and again, both in this land, in the region, and the world 
over, that political problems must be resolved politically, consensually. Military 
options, whether war, or counterinsurgency, don’t work. The world’s strongest 
military has not been able to crush the spirit of resistance of the invaded and 
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occupied, neither in Afghanistan nor in Iraq, despite both countries having been 
ruined and devastated.  
Chakma communities carry out cremation of their dead family members and there 
are various funeral rituals related to the cremation. However, this ‘cremation’ was carried 
out by the military officers without the presence of family and friends (New Age 2017, 
April 24). These ‘cremations’ have become a new strategy to erase evidence of 
systematic crimes by the military against Jumma activists. While military and police 
officers attend the religious rites of a Bengali man killed in the Hills in June 2017 (as 
shown below in the picture), Romel, who is a Chakma man from a poor family, has been 
reduced to a non-grievable life through the Bengali nationalist discourse. Butler (2004) 
describes a ‘grievable life’ as one who belongs to a higher social hierarchy and 
humanized by having a name, face, personal history and family. She notes in the context 
of the Israel-Palestine context that Palestinians who are killed by the Israeli army with 
support from the United States are dehumanized and rendered non-grievable by not 
having their names or other details made public, by having them rendered ‘unreal’ in the 
public imaginary. She writes: 
If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of 
violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already 
negated. They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, 
never ‘were’ (p. 33). 
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Figure 3: A military officer 
attends a Muslim religious ritual 
for a Bengali man who was 
killed in June 2017. The banner 
says: “Protest against the killing 
of motorcyclist Nayan by Pahari 
terrorists”. 
Photo: Collected from activists, 2017. 
Romel Chakma is not the first Jumma activist to have been targeted by the 
military and silenced through brutality. Political activists have been targeted for 
abduction and killing during the armed movement. Ranglai Mro, a Mro leader and 
headman from Bandarban was brutally tortured by the military in 2007, during a 
nationwide state of emergency, when he was protesting land dispossession of the Mro 
people by the activities of the military. The case of the abduction of Kalpana Chakma by 
a military officer in 1996 is particularly emblematic of Jumma women’s resistance to 
military occupation and how this feminist resistance was viewed as one of the biggest 
threats to the military’s might.  
Kalpana was an outspoken Jumma rights activist of the Hill Women’s Federation 
and in June 1996 she was abducted by Lt. Ferdous very late one night from her house in 
the presence of her two brothers and mother. While working as the coordinator of the 
  
110 
 
CHT Commission I was involved with the efforts of lawyers and activists who were 
working to bring justice to Kalpana’s family. In June 2014, prior to one of the numerous 
hearings in the Rangamati court, a group of journalists, activists and I met with the 
investigator of the case at the time. The Superintendent of Police of Rangmati who was in 
charge of the investigation at the time told us without any reticence that she did not 
believe Kalpana was abducted and thought instead she was hiding in India. This 
corroborated with the military version of events of the time. For some the military tried to 
construct a story of a romantic affair between Kalpana Chakma and Lt. Ferdous. When 
the army failed to convince people about this they gave out leaflets promising a reward to 
anyone who could find her. Siddiqi (2017) argues: 
Keeping the story of Kalpana Chakma alive works as a powerful form of 
resistance to Bengali domination. The Bangladeshi state and the armed forces 
would like to erase the entire Kalpana Chakma episode (p. 231). 
Lt. Ferdous is currently known to be posted in Mymensingh Cantonment and Kalpana 
still remains missing. Bangladeshi activists, lawyers, scholars and international 
organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Survival 
International, CHT Commission have all substantiated through their investigations and 
reports that Kalpana Chakma was in fact abducted in 1996. Siddiqi points out through 
this case how the Bangladesh army helps to construct the ethnic “other,” in a strategy to 
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systematically erase the disappearance from political memory (Siddiqi 2017). Chakma 
and Hill (2013) point out: 
Although the nationalist mainstream media never characterizes it as such, the 
presence of the military in the Hills and the control of the nationalist public 
narrative is a fallout from the violent colonization of the Hills by the Bangladesh 
armed forces and Jumma women have been particularly targeted in this 
colonization. 
Conclusion 
Occupation is based on the denial of the right to self-determination (Junaid 2013). 
This chapter describes the specific nature of military occupation as it exists in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts. While occupation exists in varying different forms all over the 
world, and there are many similar examples of the contradictions that are presented by 
this form of occupation. There is in fact a denial by the state that this is an occupation. 
Even the Bengali civil society in general consents to the military presence in the Hills, 
not only supporting the use of violence by the military but also contributing to a national 
discourse of it being a necessary part of protecting the sovereignty of the state. States 
tend to give priority to borders and territories and protect them through violence while 
disregarding rightful claims of different communities and populations. Jummas have been 
taking refuge in India to escape from state and development related eviction from the 
1960s. The contradiction is created when the same institution that creates a state of 
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occupation and uses violence over a particular community is in control of the tourism and 
realizes its corporate and political interests through this act. The peculiarity of military 
occupation in the Hills in Bangladesh is that the occupiers present themselves as a 
democratic nation-state. The democracy of the occupiers is thus in direct contradiction 
with the very undemocratic and violent nature of their occupation of these areas. 
Ironically, defining themselves as democratic helps legitimize this occupation and 
violence. This democracy is made to serve territorial nationalism, a discourse within 
which occupation, as an ongoing war on the frontiers of the state, plays the role of a kind 
of nationalistic glue that artificially binds the nation together (Junaid, 2013). Under these 
circumstances military-controlled tourism can be seen as what Rhoda Kanaaneh calls 
“soft occupation” (Visweswaran 2013), one which is used as a strong argument for 
protecting the tourists and which justifies the presence of the military. 
In the next chapter, using ethnographic data from my fieldwork I look at how 
tourism is a powerful site which reflects the Bengali state’s national project, which rejects 
the rights of the Jummas to land and identity and how the Bengali nationalist narrative 
enables structural and symbolic violence through the promotion of the tourist industry 
and the invoking of the need to protect the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 4: The Structural and Symbolic Violence of Tourism in the Hills 
In this chapter, I examine present-day tourism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to 
argue that it is underpinned with structural and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1992) that 
expedites and expands a four-decade long colonization process by the ruling elite in 
Bangladesh. Although it is promoted as a development project, in reality the ruling elite 
which owns the industry and reaps its profits, not least the military institution. This 
primarily Bengali elite has been expanding on and expropriating Jumma land, regularly 
resorting to violence and cooptation to achieve its ends. Relatedly, I argue that the 
asymmetrical power relationship between Bengali tourists and Jumma local residents has 
evolved through a history of state expansion on Jumma people’s lands achieved through 
violence and impunity, as well as policies that encourage exclusionary citizenship and the 
construction of ethnic-based hierarchies. The ethnicity of Jummas has become a tourist 
commodity, which conceals the structural inequalities created by the nation-state between 
Jummas and Bengalis. Tourism is a powerful site for this socio-spatial politics, and 
clearly reflects the Bengali state’s national project, which violently rejects indigenous 
rights to an autonomous identity and the rights to the land in the Hills. This history of 
Bengali nationalism enables structural and symbolic violence under the banner of 
protecting and promoting the tourist industry and the territorial integrity of Bangladesh. 
Tourism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts embodies the socio-spatial politics and practices of 
state territorialisation where the struggle over territory, identity and history plays out 
between the tourists and the locals. 
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“Shanti Shompriti Unnoyon”  
During my fieldwork, I spent three days in Ruilui Para (village), popularly known 
as the ‘Sajek tourist spot’. This area under Rangamati Hill District was declared a 
Reserve Forest by the Bangladesh government after the country’s independence. Before 
opening it up as a popular tourist spot, it was a very remote area inhabited by mostly 
Tripura and Lushai communities, who have been internally displaced by state policies 
and ‘development’ projects. In Bangladesh, the Forest Department is known to be a 
corrupt state institution which instead of preserving the forests for ecological balance, 
profits from the sale of timber. Adnan (2010) points out that there are instances in which 
the Forest Department has been found to “… use false reports about the areas to be 
acquired and/or bypass due processes of state acquisition in order to take over Pahari 
lands in the CHT” (p. xix). In other areas of Bangladesh outside the Hills, Khalil (2007) 
argues that the Forest Department colluded with international donors such as the Asian 
Development Bank and World Bank in “financing projects of mass destruction in the 
name of development, destroying acre after acre of Sal forest”. The declaration of Sajek 
as a Reserve Forest under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department thus was never meant 
to ensure its protection from corporate exploitation. 
Being on the border area, Sajek has a history of giving refuge to displaced people. 
Before Bangladesh became independent, indigenous Mizo rebels who were fighting 
against the Indian government had taken refuge in the area with support from the 
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Pakistan government. At a critical time when the Mizo movement was going strong, 
Bangladesh became an independent nation with support from the Indian government, thus 
the Mizos suddenly found themselves in a new and enemy country, without support from 
the Pakistan government and had to flee the territory overnight using various routes 
(Schendel 2015). 
Although Sajek technically falls under Baghaichari Upazila (sub-district) of the 
Rangamati Hill District, the route from Rangamati town is complicated and tourists favor 
the faster land route through the Khagrachari Hill District. Going through Rangamati 
requires taking a boat through the Kaptai Lake and then traveling another 35km uphill. 
Sajek Valley is about 70 kilometers from Khagrachari town going via Dighinala Upazila, 
under Khagrachari district. Baghaichari is the largest Upazila in Bangladesh and Sajek 
Union (rural area) is the largest union in Bangladesh (702 sq miles). It takes about three 
hours to travel to Sajek tourist point from Khagrachari town. There are several check-
posts along the way from Khagrachari to Sajek Valley but the main military check-post is 
by the Dighinala army cantonment where the military collects information about all the 
passengers and their travel itinerary. 
On the North of Sajek is India’s Tripura, East is India’s Mizoram, West is 
Khagrachari and in the South is Rangamati. The district of Rangamati begins under 
Baghaichari Upazila at the end of Dighinala. The Baghaihat Bazaar is the biggest market 
in the area. In 2010, this Bazaar was a scene of conflict between Jummas and new 
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Bengali settlers who were being brought in to build the roads for development and 
tourism (IWGIA, 2010). During that time, military officers would harass Jummas coming 
to the bazaar in various ways, including by forcing them to get down from their vehicles 
and walk some part of the path. Sajek Nari Samaj (Sajek Women’s Society) and Sajek 
Bhumi Rakkha Committee (Sajek Land Protection Committee) had called for a boycott of 
the bazaar which had led to further clashes and the military had detained many Jumma 
men. In response Jumma women had come out with sticks and brooms in a face-off with 
the military (IWGIA, 2010). Now this bazaar, along with Masalong bazaar, is the main 
hub from where all the food supply for the tourists come from. 
The roads from Dighinala to Sajek are rough, narrow and Steep. Ruilui Para is 
about 2000 feet above the sea level. It is impossible for an ordinary two-wheel drive car 
to go up such hills. The Chander Gari (moon vehicle) which we hired from Khagrachari 
is a special four-wheel drive car. Mintu Chakma, our driver, was a seasoned driver as we 
understood from his conversation and later confirmed from his skilled driving. The trick 
in driving uphill, he told us, was to not stop and to keep a good distance from the cars on 
both sides. The narrow width of the road made it tricky sometimes when cars from the 
opposite direction were coming. But unless it was a large army truck it was possible to 
pass through without too much trouble. We were traveling in a chander gari, a four-
wheel drive converted pickup truck with three rows of open seats and a top. Although one 
would think the top is meant for keeping personal belongings in we soon found out that 
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young Sajek tourists are more likely to use the seats for that purpose and the top for a 
more ‘thrilling’ ride, despite its 
obvious dangers and more likely 
because of it. 
 
Figure 4: Young Dhaka-based tourists 
on top of a chander gari. 
Photo: fieldwork, 2016. 
We came across several sign boards put up by the military asking tourists not to throw 
candy or biscuits to the Jumma children. Early on in 2016 a Jumma child was run over 
and killed under the wheels of a tourist vehicle when she ran in front of it to grab candy 
that was being thrown out from the car (CHT Observer 2016, Feb 18). Throwing candy at 
Jumma children had apparently become a new tourist practice in Sajek. On the military’s 
website under ‘Concerns’ it advises tourists to: “Carry Chocolates for the local children 
which will make them happy” (Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari, 2014a). Clearly the 
military was trying to reproduce the colonial trope of creating a spectacle by exploiting 
the body of the native. 
The military promotes the area as the Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari 
(ROCK Sajek). Although it is promoted as Khagrachari by name the area is technically 
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under Rangamati. Even their website says “A journey to the paradise of Khagrachari-
Sajek” (Regional Officers’ Club Khagrachari, 2014b). There was once a suggestion under 
the Strategic Management Forum (mentioned in chapter 3) to bring Sajek under 
Khagrachari. It would make the administration of the tourism in Khagrachari and Sajek 
more manageable under one military garrison. Under ROCK Sajek there are two military-
run hotels– the Sajek Resort at the very beginning of Ruilui Para (Ruilui is a Lushai word 
meaning ‘creek full of treasures’) and Runmoy (Lushai word meaning ‘beautiful house’) 
marking the end of Ruilui Para, a Border Outpost and the beginning of Konglak Para 
(another village frequented by tourists). Between these two hotels are numerous Tripura 
homes, most of them have been converted by their owners into cottages for tourists. The 
Tripura Jumma people have been living here for generations and their presence makes it 
an ‘authentic’ eco-tourism experience. Despite the history of conflict in the area, the 
military paints a different picture in their online marketing materials:  
“Khagrachari is a strikingly lovely fraction of the Chittagong hill tracts of 
Bangladesh. It is a sample of ever-green woody heavens with natural waterfalls, 
dancing white-grey cloud and of course myriads of colorful singing birds and 
exotic animals. The picturesque landscape is adorned with starling hills, steep 
cliffs wedged between cloud and sky, rivers and lakes filled with legends 
mysterious caves, green-gold woods lining the tribal villages.” (Region Officers' 
Club Khagrachari, 2014b).  
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Figure 5: An aerial view of Ruilui 
Para, Sajek tourist area. 
Photo: ROCK Sajek website. 
We stayed two nights 
at the non-air-conditioned twin rooms at Sajek Resort which charges Tk. 10,000 ($165 
CAD) per night (Table 2). A full advance payment has to be made through Trust Bank, 
the military owned private commercial bank. When I was making the payment at a Trust 
Bank branch the employee at 
the bank didn’t hold back her 
shock at the room rent. She 
asked me if I was just booking 
a room or a full hotel. 
 
Photo: Room rates ($1CAD = Tk. 60) 
at the Sajek Resort with rates that vary very widely for the military and civilians (Source: ROCK Sajek 
website). 
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The young Bengali tourists do not stay at the two army hotels. The Tripura homes 
converted to cottages are more affordable options for them charging between Tk. 1000 
(CAD 16) and Tk. 3000 (CAD 48) per night. The two army resorts are frequented by 
families of military officers. The table above shows how military officers have to pay a 
lower rate at the hotels in a bid to keep the hotels exclusive. Ordinary tourists are not 
allowed to go inside ROCK 
Sajek unless they have booked 
rooms there. 
 
Figure 6: Military signboard saying 
‘Shanti Shompriti, Unnoyon.’  
Photo: Fieldwork, 2016. 
There are several military signboards in the tourist areas in Sajek saying ‘Shanti 
Shompriti Unnoyon’ in Bangla, meaning ‘peace, harmony and development’. In the three 
days that I spent time in Sajek tourist area I could see that the Bengali tourists could 
easily feel a sense of ‘peace’ and ‘harmony’ during the few days they spend in the area. 
With the visible military presence in the area looking after their welfare it did create a 
sense of security for the tourists. They did not need the know what the threat was that the 
army was protecting them from. The few tourists to whom we spoke detailed their visits 
to other places in the Hills, where they were planning to visit next, which of the Jumma 
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food and clothing they were fond of and the simplicity of the Jumma people. They 
seemed to be happy to be immersed in the landscape and in the company of each other. 
The history and politics of the place was not of an immediate concern for them. 
One of the two helipads belonging to the military on Ruilui Para was a very 
popular spot for tourists. On the first day, we found a group of nine university students 
sitting in a circle discussing relationship values with each other. The area is known for 
being a spot from where one can view both sunrise and sunset. Mizoram’s villages are 
visible from the spot. Hall (2007) argues that it is indigenous tourism that best illustrates 
how tourism never occurs in a political vacuum. He points out that every decision 
regarding indigenous tourism is a political process and involves struggle for power. 
Mikel Chakma, a Jumma activist of the Hill Students Council under UPDF, alluded to 
this when he spoke to me: 
You don’t need a gun to kill me. You don’t need a knife to kill me. You can kill 
me just through doing your form of ‘development’. Sajek is nothing but a way of 
slowly killing us, of getting rid of us. This is not development for us. The kind of 
development you are doing through tourism has evicted Jumma people from their 
land. So who is this development meant for? We don’t want this development. 
We will only consider it ‘development’ if the local people are part of that 
development and the local people are beneficiaries of that development. We want 
an end to this process. For us, each of the tourist spot is a weapon against us. We 
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(Hill Students Council) not only oppose this form of tourism, we want to see an 
end to this. It’s not just our land that is at stake here, it is we who are at stake. 
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla by author] 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Jummas in Sajek protest state-supported 
land-grabbing and illegal settlement in 2011.  
Source: CHT Commission fact-finding visit, 2011. 
Army presence clearly means different things to different people, depending on 
their political and social identities and allegiances. Muktasree Chakma Sathi’s said this 
about the military presence: 
Bengali tourists of course feel safe when they see the military, because the locals 
look different from the Bengalis. When the Bengalis come here and see that the 
military officers look like them, they feel safer under them. Also for so many 
years such a narrative has been formed about Jummas that they are all against 
  
123 
 
peace, so now it’s difficult to understand otherwise. Today, you and I went to a 
restaurant 10 minutes away from my house [in Rangamati] which cost me 20 
takas and we had to go past five army trucks. If you have to run into five army 
trucks in a 10-minute distance imagine the chilling situation we live in the Hills, 
why would I even feel like coming out of the house? 
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla] 
Muktasree completed a post-graduation in law at Chittagong University but 
worked as a journalist at several newspapers of the country and now runs a women’s 
organization known as Supporting People and Rebuilding Communities. Based in 
Rangamati where she grew up, her organization trains young Jumma men and women on 
legal issues related to violence. Since rape, forced prostitution and other sexual violence 
of Jumma women happens quite widely around the Hills, her organization has taken up 
training young Jummas to understand the underlying politics of control and build up a 
resistance to combat such violence at the community level in the absence of justice from 
the local administration. D’Costa (2014) points out how sexual and gender-based 
violence has been used as a tool to intimidate Jummas into selling their land at bargain 
prices often the land is resold to military personnel and their families which helps them to 
invest in the tourism industry “contributing to the cycle of militarisation of the CHT” (p. 
35). D’Costa (2014) argues that due to poverty Jumma women have limited access to the 
formal justice system and reliable legal representation. This combined with the “culture 
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of impunity” (p. 43) that is characteristic of the Hills, violence affects Jumma women and 
their families disproportionately. 
The Ruilui Para resort area is a long strip of road with cottages, restaurants and 
Jumma homes lining both sides. After the resorts were set up, the military had painted all 
the fences with the red and green color of Bangladesh’s national flag. This national 
symbol asserted that the territory and its people belonged to Bangladesh. The Jummas 
needed to be reminded that they were part of Bangladesh and their businesses needed to 
visibly demonstrate that allegiance. This is a visibly exclusionary state-sponsored 
national assimilation project. Swagatam Chakma points out: 
My father was part of a drama group and so we would have rehearsals in our 
house all the time. I grew up watching all this around us. But when we were 
running around from one place to another after being evicted from our homes we 
struggled just to get food for ourselves every day, those things never came back to 
our house again. This is how the cultural practices disappeared from our lives. If I 
grew up in a healthy and normal environment music and culture would be a big 
part of my life, but that has been robbed away from us. The Bangladesh state is 
using the same policy against indigenous people that have been used by Australia, 
Canada or the US. They’ve nearly wiped out the indigenous people and the areas 
where they used to live have been turned into tourist spots. This happened in these 
country 50-100 years ago and its happening in Bangladesh now. 
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 [Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla] 
 
Figure 8: The military painted Jumma 
people’s homes with red and green of the 
Bangladesh national flag. 
Photo: fieldwork, 2016. 
Siraj and Bal (2016) point out that 
exclusion and marginalisation of minorities has been advocated by the power holders in 
Bangladesh by focusing on ethnicity and religion as the most vital factor of their national 
identity. The painting of the Jumma homes on the one hand symbolizes assertion of state 
territorial power over the Jummas’ lands and bodies but is also symbolic of the exclusion 
of the Jummas from the national imagination by othering and criminalizing them. This is 
also an illustration of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence and domination (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant 1992) where he described how societies are classified and legitimize those 
classifications in order for one group to dominate the other. He points out that dominant 
groups have to do little to maintain this dominance. 
The day we arrived in Ruilui Para, we were told that about 30 tourists vehicles 
had arrived – each carrying anywhere between 10 to 20 tourists. Nitol Tripura, who 
owned the Tong Resort said that he was thinking of naming it the Blue Mountain Cottage 
and perhaps build an additional cottage after the obvious success of this one. Workers 
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were busy working with wood to build the rooms and beds in the hotel. He said that they 
had started working on the hotel about two weeks ago and it would be done by the end of 
the weekend. 
While walking along the road I spotted Borun Tripura2 and his friends going past 
us in an auto-rickshaw. Borun was an activist for the Pahari Chattra Parishad (Hill 
Students’ Council). He was visiting Sajek with his one of his Bengali friends, Aftab 
(names changed for privacy). Borun now lived in Dhaka and worked for a bank where he 
met his companion. We had met at the bus stop in Dhaka on our way to Khagrachari. In 
Khagrachari we had parted ways, but met up again in Sajek. They had arrived in Sajek in 
a three-wheel autorickshaw, a slightly more risky but cheaper way of traveling to Sajek. 
After a long conversation, Aftab mentioned that he was an entrepreneur and the purpose 
of the trip to Sajek was more business than pleasure. Aftab was looking for a location in 
Sajek to set up a barbecue restaurant with indigenous song and dance performance on 
weekends. The idea was that Borun would buy the land under his Tripura name, but 
Aftab would provide the rest of the investment. This arrangement allowed the ownership 
to remain under a Jumma person, thus giving the restaurant Jumma ‘authenticity’.  The 
profits, however, would go to the Bengali with the money and business acumen. When 
Aftab was not within earshot Borun confided in us that he was not entirely comfortable 
with this agreement. His money-making instincts were in conflict with his political 
beliefs as an activist resisting Bengali dominance. In a cooptation power relationship, 
                                                 
2 Names changed for confidentiality. 
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Hall (2007) cautions against thinking about unwilling and willing compliance to 
domination as mutually exclusive, asserting that “one can consent to power and resent the 
mode of its exercise”. 
We spoke to the people working very diligently at a work site where we could see 
6 cement pillars. At this construction site, there were about a dozen Bengali day-laborers 
and when I asked one of the workers how big the building would be, I was told it was 
going to be an eight-story hotel. Mintu told me that this would be a Deputy 
Commissioner’s hotel but it would be impossible to build an eight-story building on top 
of a mountain. Adnan (2010) argues that some of the biggest grabbing of Jumma people’s 
lands in the Hills have been by state agencies including the Forest Department and the 
military, in collusion with the Deputy Commissioners who have to give the final 
approval. He also adds that proper procedures are often not even followed. 
Behind the Proverbial Tourists’ Blinkers 
On our way back from Sajek our companions strongly advised us to visit Alutila. 
The main attraction in Alutila is a cave, also referred to as the “mysterious cave”, which 
is a 100-metre-long cave going underground where sunlight does not reach. Tourists 
usually make a fire torch and carry it with them through the cave giving it the 
“mysterious” feel. As tourists who visit Sajek have to enter the Hills through Khagrachari 
district they almost invariably visit Alutila as part of the adventure package. The Alutila 
cave however is an old tourist spot that was in fact set up by the Hill District Council and 
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not under the auspices of the military. One has to climb down more than 200 steps to 
reach the mouth of the cave. Although Khagrachari had been the least popular tourist spot 
until recently, the possibilities opened up with the popularity of Sajek and its potential 
began to be recognized with adventure-seeking tourists. 
While I was conducting my fieldwork, the Bangladesh Economic Zone Authority 
(BEZA) under the Prime Minister's Office set up the Alutila Special Tourism Zone, 
Khagrachari on 700 acres of land. Although the government marked it as ‘khas’ 
(government) land, the area was inhabited by around 518 mostly Tripura families in 21 
villages in the three Mouzas for generations. Most of the families carried out jhum and 
other forms of cultivation on this land, which also included educational institutions, 
religious complexes and cremation grounds. The setting up of this special tourist zone 
would mean the eviction of the people and complete destruction of their livelihoods. Both 
the Jumma political groups, UPDF and PCJSS along with the local Tripura families and 
the wider activist groups in Dhaka protested this government decision and the plan was 
finally cancelled in October 2016, after I had returned from my fieldwork. The fear of 
being evicted from their homes and land is something that Jummas live with every day.  
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Figure 9: Jumma homes with posters protesting the 
government’s proposal to take over 700 acres of 
land for tourism in Alutila, Khagrachari. 
Photo: Sanjay Kumar Barua, 2016. 
None of the tourists we came 
across in Sajek were aware of these 
political developments. At the Helipad we 
had spoken to a newly-married couple from Dhaka, Dipon and Nimmi who were 
proclaimed adventure-seekers. Since they got married they informed us they decided to 
visit a new place every time they went on holidays, and confessed that all their earnings 
were spent on these. Dipon said he appreciated the different culture of the Jummas and 
that was an obvious attraction for him, but he noted that it was ‘unfortunate what the 
Jummas were doing in the Hills’. When I asked him what it was about the Jummas that 
bothered him, he said that they seemed to have an inherent dislike for Bengalis and 
Bangladesh and were constantly fighting and carrying out mischief. He seemed unaware 
of the state’s land-grabbing activities. Tourists are thus ‘light-hearted’ figures who did 
not care much about the systemic inequalities between the tourists and locals. As Salazar 
(2017) observes, tourists are unaware of the impact they had on their destinations. And 
the military is quite content to keep it that way. The ROCK Sajek military website uses 
flowery language when describing the area to tourists: 
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Far from the crowd, urban and noisy places, Sajek is a quiet place to relax and 
rejuvenate you away from the hustle & bustle of the city . . . The small village on 
the mountains is full of exotic beauty filled with eco-friendly environment. 
Mountains covered with lush green trees, cold atmosphere, fresh air, beautiful 
valleys and most importantly clouds on the roads hugging you with full of 
happiness and one of the different feelings that you will have, after seeing the 
unseen beauty of both sunrise and sunset from the same place. (Region Officers' 
Club Khagrachari, 2014.)  
While I was writing my thesis in May/June 2017 the Bangladeshi newspapers 
reported that an acute food shortage had hit Sajek. The Daily Star reported that without 
immediate government intervention people would starve to death. The newspaper also 
reported about the local government’s corruption with the food aid that had already come 
from the central government. Such food aid usually is followed by such news of 
corruption. I followed on social media my activist friends back in the Hills as they 
combined their efforts to do their own fund-raising for the affected families. The people 
of the Hills have found their own way of coping with adversity and have learned a long 
time ago not to depend on any meaningful help from the government. The food crisis in 
Sajek was not even over when Bengali settler groups in Langadu Upazila of Rangamati 
burnt down more than two hundred homes of Jumma people. Within a few weeks of the 
arson attack devastating landslides in parts of Rangamati, Bandarban and Chittagong 
killed about 130 people. It seemed like yet another paradox where the economic hardship 
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of the native Jummas in Sajek remain hidden through the flowery language used to 
present Sajek as a paradise for tourists.  
The Chittagong Hill Tracts as a “Business Hub” 
Tourism in the Hills fulfills two objectives. First is the capitalist business objective 
with little or no regard for environmental impacts or impacts on indigenous livelihood 
and culture. The second is conflict management. I interviewed Meghna Guhathakurta a 
researcher and former professor of international relations at Dhaka University, a member 
of the National Human Rights Commission and a long-time activist for the rights of the 
Jumma peoples. She pointed out: 
CHT as business investment of Bengalis is a model for controlling this so-called post-
conflict situation. Obviously, this investment is expected to be made by the dominant 
community and those sections of the community that are already there, which is the 
army. It was there from before, even during the so-called insurgency, in a closed area, 
the tourism was there in a particular, restricted way. 
The Government of Bangladesh declared 2016 to be the year of tourism and in May 
2017 the Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism, Rashed Khan Menon, said the 
government was taking initiatives to develop the Hills as “a business hub for South and 
Southeast Asia using utmost potential of huge resources of the hilly region” (The 
Independent, 2017). The minister indicated that it intended to build the CHT as an 
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“international standard tourist zone.”  Although the tourism at present caters to Bengali 
tourists, the government clearly aims to expand its business to foreigners who will bring 
in more revenue. The present political situation, however, would make it very 
challenging to attract foreigners. There is a travel warning for foreigners against traveling 
to the Hills. The government of Canada also advises their citizens not to travel to the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts when they are traveling to Bangladesh (Government of Canada, 
2017). 
As the tenth most densely populated country in the world, with a population of 160 
million people, Bangladesh struggles to move beyond its status as a developing nation. In 
an effort to achieve this, the government has been trying to sell itself as an attractive 
tourist destination. Although the military presence has made it difficult for foreigners to 
enter the CHT, the tourism ministry is already said to have identified new locations in the 
CHT for developing tourism and finding ways to attract foreign tourists (CHT Regional 
Council memo, Feb 23, 2015). The PCJSS has expressed its displeasure at the decisions 
taken by the ministry as the indigenous communities have not been consulted about these 
plans. The World Bank also has a proposed $360million sub-regional connectivity project 
between India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh as part of which two land ports will be 
built in the CHT which roads going through the CHT will connect to India and Myanmar 
and this will increase the flow of people through the CHT (Qatar Tribune, 2016).  
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The Ministry for CHT Affairs (MOCHTA) which was established through a 
provision under the CHT Accord and was initially thought would help to smoothen the 
implementation of the Accord in fact is more involved in promoting tourism and cultural 
aspects related to the Hills. The tourism projects undertaken by the government are 
always a joint venture between the MOCHTA and the Ministry of Civil Aviation and 
Tourism. Although it did formally hand over the management of local tourism to three 
Hill District Councils in 2014 (Chakma and Chakma 2015), in practice nothing has 
changed. The Hill District Councils themselves have not been able to function according 
to the provisions set out in the Accord as there haven’t yet been elections for posts under 
the Councils. Until the elections take place, the positions will continue to be occupied by 
the individuals belonging to the political party in power.  
The Tourist Industry and Manufacturing of Public Consent 
Jumma activists and civil society groups have raised their concerns about the loss 
of Jumma people’s lands through tourism but the activities of the various state agencies 
to expand tourism without consultation with the local people has continued unabated. The 
Minister for Tourism, also chairman of the Workers Party of Bangladesh, however stated 
that the ministry was looking to include more Jumma people in the mainstream 
development activities. At a workshop organized by the MOCHTA and International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) titled “Destination Management 
Plan” in May 2017 he also said that the government was looking to turn the Hills into a 
  
134 
 
‘business hub’ saying that the area “..could be one of the major tourist destinations of the 
world for its natural beauty with hills, rivers, lakes and waterfalls” and that the “… 
government is working to build the CHT as an international standard tourist zone” (The 
Independent 2017). Neither the government, nor the military has said anything about 
resolving the land conflicts in the area or mentioned anything about the eviction of 
Jumma people from the area. Although the MOCHTA was established as part of the CHT 
Accord to ensure the welfare of the Jumma people, in reality it has become a mouthpiece 
for the government’s activities. MOCHTA is actively involved in promoting tourism in 
the area with no consultation with the Jumma peoples. In recent times, it has sponsored 
cycling tours, marathons and various kinds of festivals. It has said nothing about 
resolving land 
conflicts or land 
loss of the Jumma 
peoples. 
 
Figure 10: A poster for a cycling tour in the Chittagong Hill Tracts sponsored by MOCHTA. 
Photo: Ministry Of CHT Affairs, 2017. 
One of the most contentious problems in the Hills is that land disputes between 
Jummas and Bengali settlers are yet to be settled. For years the Land Commission set up 
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through the CHT Accord has failed to settle these disputes as there have never been any 
consensus over how to settle them. The Accord stated that:  
The government shall allot additional funds on priority basis for implementation 
of increased number of projects in CHT. New projects formulated with an aim to 
make necessary infrastructures for facilitating development in the area shall be 
implemented on priority basis and the government shall provide funds for these 
purposes. The government shall, considering the state of environment in the 
region, encourage developing tourism for tourists from within the country and 
abroad. 
In terms of tourism, the Jumma political groups have identified that at least 1700 
acres of land, locations of tourist resorts by the military, have caused the eviction of at 
least 700 Jumma families from 26 villages (Chakma and Chakma, 2015). The military 
resort in Nilgiri in the Bandarban hill district for example, evicted 200 Mro and Marma 
families from six villages in the area and though they have 16 acres of land recorded 
under the facility, they ended up acquiring 60 acres. There are numerous examples of 
such land-grabbing for tourism throughout the Hills. 
Sajeeb Chakma note that 15 new locations had been identified by the military and 
the tourism ministry, along with MOCHTA, for setting up new tourist complexes. when I 
interviewed him he pointed out that the Tourism ministry had held a meeting with the 
military to identify these locations: 
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The way it stands now, the BGB, military or any company, private individual or a 
government agency can set up tourism here. There is no recognition of the land 
loss of indigenous people here and no respect for indigenous people’s culture, for 
the special governance system in the area, this is where we are concerned. We 
have spoken to people there and found out all this information about how land 
was grabbed. There is no clarity over who is going to give leadership and deal 
with the issues. It is also not clear to us what benefit will come to the adibashi 
people here or what harm will come to them – their land rights, issues related to 
their culture and heritage is kept unclear. It’s the military who is making all the 
biggest investments in tourism in the CHT.  
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from the Bangla] 
The increased presence of Bengali tourists also helped to normalize militarization 
and accentuate its non-threatening appearance, something that I noticed during my 
fieldwork. This, however, contradicts recent decisions by the military and administration 
to restrict communication between Bengalis and Jummas. As Mong Shanoo Chowdhury 
explained: 
The main problem here is that the places where the [military] are developing 
tourism, we the adibashis had been living there for a long time, they are evicting 
us from there and carrying out this business. That is where our fundamental 
objection lies. Chimbuk Pahar, Boga Lake, Sajek and several other places where 
  
137 
 
the military has set up tourist spots, have they ever bothered to take permission 
from the Hill District Council before setting these up? It clearly says in the CHT 
Accord that permission from the HDC needs to be taken before anyone can set 
this place up for tourism. Don’t you think there is a conflict here based on land? 
But who is going to take any action against the military? Even the government is 
afraid of them. The land issue is the main problem here and through this a lot of 
other issues have popped up, so we really need to address the land problem very 
seriously. The military is expanding their tourism business means they are 
intensifying the land problems.  
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla] 
In 2012, the administration in an official notice declared that Bengalis and 
foreigners from outside the CHT would be barred from speaking to Jummas without the 
presence of government officials. This announcement was targeted towards journalists 
and human rights activists who were reporting about the violence against the Jummas and 
not meant for tourists, although they could not make this distinction clear and doing so 
would again raise questions about their presence (Amnesty International, 2015).  
Development related to tourism is meant for tourists only and not for the Jumma 
peoples as Samari Chakma points out: 
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All the development that is taking place in the Hills because of tourism does not 
benefit the common people of the area. The portable water tank that was set up in 
the Sajek area, the Jumma people do not have access to it. This water, these roads, 
this electricity is not for me, it’s for the tourists only. Yes a few of them [the 
Jummas] will get rich. If the state wanted to do something for our benefit they 
would consult with us but they have don’t nothing of the sort. 
The concern for most of the JSS activists I spoke with were about how the present 
nature of tourism development in the Hills were not aligned with what was promised in 
the Accord, and not an opposition to tourism per se. The Accord promised to hand over 
the tourism subject to the Hill District Council and although in August 2014 it was 
formally handed over, the real control of decisions related to tourism development really 
lay with the government and the military. Sajeeb Chakma points out: 
They handed over the subject to the three hill districts but they put on various 
conditions on them. The powers of the Hill District Councils have been curtailed 
through these conditions. In terms of taking decisions and deploying people the 
powers mainly belong to the Parjatan Corporation [the government tourism 
board]. Although the Accord says that decisions about tourism will be taken on 
the basis of discussion between the HDC, the Ministry of CHT Affairs and the 
Parjatan Corporation, it does not say anything about the Regional Council. So the 
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way it stands now, the BGB, military or any company, private individual or a 
government agency can set up tourist spots here. 
Adnan and Dastidar (2010) point out that some of the largest takeovers of Jumma 
people’s lands in the Hills have been through acquisition by various agencies of the state 
including the Forest Department and the security forces: 
In most cases, these state agencies activate formal land acquisition procedures 
mediated by the office of the Deputy Commissioner (DC). However, in some 
instances, these agencies have also taken over Pahari lands unlawfully, without 
following the required land acquisition procedures (p. xviii). 
The 1958 CHT (Land Acquisition) Regulation allows the DC to use their power 
to acquire land without giving prior notice to the landowners and affected parties do not 
have an option to appeal. 
Imaginaries of Tourism and the Paradox of the Ethnic Other 
Eid, the Muslim religious holiday, is a national sometimes weeklong holiday in 
Bangladesh. Dhaka is emptied of its majority migrant population and people from all 
walks of life go back to their village homes all over the country. The city, roughly the 
size of London, Ontario and with a population of more than 10 million, wears an almost 
deserted look on Eid morning. In recent times, the Bengali middle class have also started 
vacationing outside Dhaka during Eid. Tour packages are promoted by using seductive 
  
140 
 
images of the places and the indigenous peoples. Salazar and Graburn (2014) posit that 
without “imaginaries” or “fantasies” it is almost impossible to think of tourism. While the 
state and the elite use these fantasies about indigenous people to make profit and maintain 
dominance, Bengali hegemony is used to construct the official national identity and 
render the Jummas as the ethnic other (Yasmin, 2014; Tripura, 2016). In 2011, the 
government officially denied the existence of indigenous people in Bangladesh and 
District Commissioners were directed by the Intelligence Agency of the Home Ministry 
not to celebrate World Indigenous People’s Day on August 9: 
Steps should be taken to publicize/broadcast in the print and electronic media that 
there are no Indigenous people in Bangladesh. The month of August is recognized 
nationally as the month of mourning. Hence, such unnecessary celebration 
programmes in the name of Indigenous Day in this month should be avoided. 
(Official memo from ministry of LGRD, March 11, 2012) 
It was important for the government to point out that remembering the ‘father of 
the Bengali nation’ Sheikh Mujib was far more important than a celebration of the 
indigenous people’s identity. Although the two days are on different dates of the month, 
the celebration on one day would somehow blemish the solemnity of the other day. In 
1984 in their report to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), the 
Anti-Slavery Society of London criticized the Bangladesh delegation’s report where they 
claim “Bangladesh has no indigenous population” (Faiz and Mohaiemen, 2010). Hall 
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(2007) argues that tourism can silence indigenous voices with the romantic representation 
of indigenous peoples used in tourism promotion but it has “substantial implications not 
only for tourism but also for the longer-term development of indigenous identity and 
well-being” (p. 318). Yasmin (2016) calls it the “tyranny of the majority” (p. 116) and 
Tripura (2015) refers to: 
…the singular and exclusionist conceptions of key notions such as ‘nationality’, 
‘nationalism’, ‘state language’ and ‘national culture’, whereby the diversity of 
languages and ethnic identities of the country are overlooked, or at best relegated 
to a marginal and inferior status (p. 1). 
Schendel (2015) has pointed out that in post-independence Bangladesh three first-
generation historiographies emerged and played a dominant role in the national narrative. 
The first of these and the one relevant for understanding Bengali tourism imaginaries in 
the Hills is that of the Bengali national triumph over the Pakistanis and its implications 
on the silencing of other narratives. 
At the beginning of my fieldwork I was also able to speak to Sam Tripura in 
Dhaka. Sam is a member of the Headman Association based in Khagrachari and received 
reports from headmen in the other districts. He pointed out: 
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Tourism in the Hills is carried out in areas where the most vulnerable people live. 
You will see that in Bandarban it’s the Mro area that was targeted and Nilgiri was 
set up there and in Sajek the Tripura and Pankhuya community were targeted. 
[Fieldwork, June 2016, translated from Bangla] 
Sam and a number of other respondents also pointed out that this business model 
was also expanding into sex trafficking in the area and poor young Jumma girls were 
being drawn into it while the local authorities were aware of it and possibly benefitting 
from it. Sam mentioned to me that he had two reports of girls under the age of 18 having 
been to Dighinala Hospital for abortion. Later it was discovered that the girls were 
impregnated by tourists. He said that the parents were so poor that they had in fact given 
consent to this act. Sam said that there were a number of these cases but the girls and 
their families would be too ashamed to talk about this. Samari Chakma, a lawyer based in 
Khagrachari said: 
A lot of Jumma girls are increasingly forced into sex work because of tourism. A 
lot of girls are trafficked and many of them are forced to become surrogate 
mothers. Unfortunately, the NGOs who work here are not very interested in 
working on these issues where they have to face the authorities, they want to work 
on safer issues like the environment, where there is funding. 
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Dawnai Prue Naly, a woman’s rights activist belonging to the Bohmong King’s 
family ran a local organization involved in rescuing girls who were forced into sex 
trafficking. I have known her since 2009 while I was working with the CHT Commission 
and was aware of a number of rescue missions she was personally involved in and how 
her own life had been endangered several times because of her work. She runs a training 
program for young Jumma girls now. She explained that: 
Because of tourism all kinds of people have started coming to Bandaraban and 
they think of Jumma girls as something to consume. The rate of child prostitution 
is rising very dangerously and there is also more rape in the area than before. 
They think it is very easy to rape Jumma girls and get away with it. Recently a 
Bengali man raped an 11-year-old girl. He came to Bandarban to drive cars for 
tourists. I personally got him arrested. Unfortunately, the case is not strong 
because there are no witnesses. We will probably lose the case. We are not able to 
control this situation. It’s very difficult. 
Rape in general has been used as a tool to oppress the Jumma population and rape 
and other sexual violence has been instrumental in making Jumma communities leave 
their homes and becoming refugees in other parts of the Hills and thereby facilitating the 
grabbing of their lands for commercial purposes and for tourism (Chakma 2013). 
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Cameras, Neo-Colonialism and the Tourist Gaze 
In July 2016 during my fieldwork I attended a photo exhibition at DRIK Gallery. 
The exhibition was titled, ‘Chittagong Hill Tracts: People and Nature’ and was organized 
by MOCHTA, UNDP, USAID and Bangladeshi NGOs BRAC, Manusher Jonno 
Foundation, Podokkhep and Bangladesh Adventure Club. The exhibition was clearly 
catering to the Bengali middle-class tourists with pictures of the exotic Mro, naked 
Jumma babies in swings and magnificent panoramic views of the Hills. None of the 
photographs hinted at any of the political struggle and violence that has been plaguing the 
lives of Jumma peoples for more than four decades. Mawani (2007) argues that nature is 
a “key cultural signifier of a national distinctiveness, one that is highly racialized and 
deeply rooted in British imperialism” (pg. 716). Mawani’s work is in reference to 
invocation of nature and pristine national parks in Canada’s national narratives, but 
which cover First Nations’ past and present struggles against colonial processes which 
evicted them from their lands, which has parallels in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and other 
places around the world.  
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Figure 11: Photo exhibition at Dhaka 
DRIK Gallery in July 2016 being 
inspected by the Minister for Information, 
the Minister and Secretary for CHT 
Affairs and the press. The dignitaries are 
wearing red and green (the color of 
Bangladesh’s flag) hadi (Chakma shawl)  
Photo: Aye Aye Maung, 2016. 
The only photograph-worthy Jumma were the exotic ones in their decorative 
jewelry and authentic clothes. Schendel, Mey & Dewan (2000) have argued that 
photography was used for the first time in the Hills by Europeans as a way of 
representing the hill people in a certain primitive way to feed a romanticised interest in 
the natives and also garner support for colonial conquests. Much of the pictorial 
anthropological representation of the Jummas from colonial times produce them as 
“living specimens… exhibited in booths, neatly classified according to race and tribe” to 
help develop theories on human evolution (Schendel, Mey & Dewan 2000). Devine 
(2017) points out: 
… representations of people and places in cultural and eco-tourism are often 
essentialized and folkloric, reflect the preconceived and stereotypical imaginaries 
of tourists, and are sold and performed in tours, postcards, sex and everyday 
interactions (p. 2). 
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Samari Chakma discusses the sense of entitlement that tourists have in the Hills 
and the power relations that exist between Jummas and Bengalis in the field of tourism as 
follows: 
During Biju this year a friend from Dhaka and I were sitting somewhere and 
talking when I suddenly noticed a man taking our photos from a distance. At first 
I gestured at him to stop taking photos but then I noticed he was not paying 
attention and continuing to take our photos. I went up to him and told him that he 
needed to stop taking our photos. He simply responded to me by saying: “I’m a 
tourist”. It was as if through his identity as a tourist he felt he was entitled to take 
our photos and he couldn’t understand why I would object to it and wouldn’t even 
acknowledge my right to privacy. 
On the day we were leaving we noticed an added level of urgency among the 
cleaning staff at our hotel. When asked about it, the hotel receptionist informed us that 
the Sri Lankan army chief would be coming the following day. The receptionist eagerly 
informed us that the army chief was a frequent visitor to Sajek. Every time he came to 
Bangladesh to give talks at the Defence College he and his team of 30 army officers 
visited Sajek. Incidentally, the Sri Lankan military has also taken up tourism in the 
previously Tamil-held areas since they brutally defeated the Tamil Tigers in 2009, killing 
nearly 40,000 Tamil civilians. Using tourism as a form of erasure of violence and 
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normalization of military presence seems to be a way the state represses resistance 
movements of minority groups. 
In Sajek the military follows a strict timetable for tourists coming in and out of 
the area. There are two arrival time and two departure time from Sajek – once at 11 in the 
morning and once at 3 in the afternoon. Depending on which departure or arrival time 
you wish to take you have to be present at the spot where all vehicles must assemble. 
Military officers who are in charge of this service do it in a rather authoritarian way as I 
noticed when we were getting prepared to head back to Khagrachari from Sajek. It was 
almost 11:00 and all the cars were lined up in a very disciplined manner ready to take off 
together. At that moment some young men got off their vehicles to take some last group 
photos together. The army officer in charge of the assembly, probably the same age as the 
young men, noticed it and yelled at them that if they did not immediately get into their 
vehicle they would have to stay. The officer had a gun in his hand. The paradox of a 
military establishment as tourist hosts once again became apparent from this hostile 
exchange. The young got back into their vehicle without another word and the cars sped 
off at exactly 11:00. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have used the case of Sajek Valley in the Chittagong Hill Tracts 
to show how military-controlled tourism is an effort that has a number of aims: mainly to 
reinforce the state’s sovereignty over Jumma territory, by confiscating their land, to 
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exclude the Jumma peoples from the national imaginary as anything but exotic others and 
erase the history and ongoing violence of the region. In contrast to the killing, torture, and 
on-going colonization and exploitation of Jummas and their lands, the Bengali middle-
class tourists are welcomed with lavish language of prefabricated dreams with a promise 
of safety, security and leisure. In the Hills violence is an inherent part of present-day 
tourism. The unresolved past and the present-day political dynamics constructs an ‘ethnic 
conflict’ and unequal relationship between the Bengalis and Jummas and sanctions 
unauthorised land-grabbing and violence by the state and Bengali elite. This framework 
produces an asymmetrical relationship between the tourists and Jummas and leads to the 
socio-spatial politics of structural and symbolic violence in the Hills. 
In the conclusion, I will explain how this thesis illustrates how state-sponsored 
tourism in the Hills has its roots in colonial methods of domination and representation 
and how it has become a space for nationalist politics of assimilation exploitation, and 
violence. 
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Chapter 5: Concluding thoughts: The State and the Political Economy of Tourism 
In June 2017, at the beginning of the monsoon season in Bangladesh, the news of 
one of the worst landslides in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began to unfold. Bangladeshi 
newspapers reported that within 24 hours a record high level of rain led to landslides in 
areas all over the three hill districts killing more than 130 people (Time, 2017). Most of 
the victims were poor Jumma people. There are very few environmental studies on the 
impact of deforestation, hill-cutting, militarization and the overall population transfer that 
the state has been carrying out since the 1970s. The loss of lives of the poor Jumma 
people in this disaster did not seem to be of the utmost concern for the local 
administration. While the military made sure that the names and pictures of the four 
military personnel who were killed during a rescue operation was published widely 
throughout the media, the names and faces of the other 126 victims did not hold as much 
importance. I received messages from my activist colleagues in Bangladesh desperately 
looking for funds to help the victims’ families in the absence of adequate government 
support. While the nameless and faceless victims’ families were trying to come to terms 
with the tragedy and while activists were frantically trying to raise funds for them, the 
Civil Aviation and Tourism Minister Rashed Khan Menon raised concern in parliament 
that through this disaster the tourism sector had incurred a loss of Tk 4 billion to Tk. 4.5 
billion ($6.6 million CAD to $7.5 million CAD) due to the landslide in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts through damage to tourist facilities and cancellation of tourist reservations 
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(The Daily Star, 09 July 2017). The state elite had clearly defined their concerns and 
priorities in the disaster. 
This thesis has dealt with the growing tourist industry in the Hills and its effects 
and implications on the Jumma people’s lives and land in the backdrop of the 
marginalized position they have in relation to the state. The popularity of the Hills as a 
tourist destination began with the signing of the Accord, but initially growth was slow 
and gradual. Prior to the CHT Accord, most of the ‘tourists’ were families of government 
officials and military officers who were posted there, and who were able to use the 
facilities provided exclusively to them. It was during that time that the political and 
military elites speculated on the economic potentials of this sector. The vagueness in the 
Accord regarding the legal status and allocation of land in the region, the corruption of 
many government officials, a widespread indifference and considerable public consent 
regarding militarization, justified by the state as a means of protecting its sovereignty, 
and the overall global capitalist expansion of the tourism sector provided the ideal 
circumstances for the ‘successful’ development of tourism in the Hills. While there is 
vast research on the resistance and political conflict in the Hills by scholars from colonial 
times, there is almost no academic research on tourism in the area, especially tourism as a 
state strategy of domination, exploitation and violence. Literature on tourism in the Hills 
as a means of exploitation have, however been appearing in the last five years in the form 
of newspaper articles, opinions and in activist discussion which shows that this is an 
emerging topic. 
  
151 
 
This research project, therefore, is just the beginning of this exploration. I was 
limited to some extent in my fieldwork because of the sensitivity of working in this 
location, especially due to my previous involvement as the coordinator of the CHT 
Commission. This role as an activist was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it 
facilitated access to my key informants. On the other hand, it limited my ability to 
conduct fieldwork without raising concerns. Apart from my particular situation, 
fieldwork, especially long-term ethnographic fieldwork, is still a challenge in the Hills for 
anyone planning to conduct research independent of state sponsorship. Chowdhury 
(2014) who spent twelve months conducting fieldwork in the Hills on the political 
ecology of forests observes: “The power and influence of the army was the single most 
difficult challenge in CHT since the army controls the region for security purposes” (p. 
41). He said that his encounters with the military angered him because he felt like “a 
foreigner in my own country” (p. 39). However, the challenges faced by academic 
researchers, journalists and activists are themselves an indication of the oppression and 
violence that lies behind the marketing of the Hills by the state as the best adventure 
tourist destination of the country. Thus, I will take these challenges and limitations into 
account when I conceptualize my PhD proposal and plan for fieldwork. This is necessary 
not only to be politically-committed and morally engaged, but more importantly for 
ethical purposes, that is, to ensure the physical safety of everyone concerned. 
There are far-reaching implications of military-controlled tourism on the power 
dynamics between the state and the Jummas in an area of protracted ‘conflict’. State 
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power is enacted and reproduced through tourism and it is used by the state as a strategy 
for dominating the region. Tourism essentially plays the role of reinforcing 
administrative, social and political hierarchies and renders the Jumma population worthy 
of the tourist gaze. The Bengali elite perceives the Jumma people as primarily objects of 
tourist consumption with no political rights, or rights to their traditional lands. Thus, it 
has categorically denied them recognition in the constitution, marginalized them 
economically and politically, represented them as the ethnic other, criminalized them 
through the media in order to justify the securitization of the Hills. In order to continue its 
repression and exploitation, the Bangladeshi state fuels nationalist passions, and invokes 
a narrative in which ‘sovereignty’ and a Muslim-Bengali identity that is threatened by 
indigenous claims are key elements. Resorting to such nationalist rhetoric is quite 
common in post-colonial countries in areas where indigenous people have led movements 
for self-determination demanding recognition of communal land ownership rights, or 
political and administrative autonomy. 
As Hall (2007) argues indigenous tourism is highly problematic because of the 
paternalistic or colonial nature of tourism that arises from differential power relations 
among the tourist, governmental authorities, and the indigenous inhabitants. However, 
Hall is aware of the dangers in homogenizing communities, and therefore calls for 
identifying “power relations within indigenous communities and the use and misuse of 
power relations” (p. 317). The study of tourism has been approached from many different 
angles. As part of the global ‘development’ agenda, largely controlled by powerful and 
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rich states, there is a big thrust for diversifying the types of tourism including 
‘community-based tourism’ and ‘eco-tourism’. Tourism in politically volatile situations is 
especially encouraged as a way of normalizing relations between oppressors and the 
oppressed. The ‘developmental’ propaganda attached to it and its public displays of 
exotics and sites, is often packaged in ways that suppress and obscure the history of 
violence and oppression. Tourism also is a way to restore unequal power relations, to 
prevent future resistance movements, and to evade accountability. Palestine, Sri Lanka, 
Kashmir in India and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh provide clear examples of 
the more destructive aspects of tourism. 
An anthropological approach to tourism is appropriate for it enables the 
researcher to look holistically at a particular case, and to incorporate historical economic, 
political, and sociocultural dynamics. Fieldwork is particularly important as it enables the 
researcher to observe how these dynamics play out in daily life and in the real world. My 
fieldwork gave me a better insight as to how power relations work between state 
authorities, tourists and locals. Some of my interviews clearly revealed these power 
dynamics, as well as the resentment and anger of the Jumma people for the continuous 
encroachment on their land, for being marginalized and minoritized by the state, and for 
being reduced to exotic figures in the Bengali tourist imaginary. 
This thesis shows how state-sponsored tourism in the Hills has its roots in 
colonial methods of domination and representation, or colonial forms of knowledge. The 
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Hills are a very distinctive political, social and cultural space which is being exploited for 
its natural and cultural resources and at the same time is the space of a nationalist politics 
of assimilation exploitation, and violence. Although it is not possible in an MA thesis to 
cover the topics in great detail, nonetheless, I have provided an overview of the critical 
aspects related to the historical and political context of the Jumma people beginning with 
the non-statehood then to limited administrative power under the Mughal period. I briefly 
examined relevant events and policies under British colonization, which led to the 
partition of India into a Hindu India and a Muslim Pakistan and the eventual creation of 
‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’, including in Pakistan, which led to the secession of Bengali-
speaking people in East Pakistan, renamed Bangladesh, a country that over time turned 
into a state in which democratic rights gave way to militarization and authoritarianism. 
This trajectory is important to understand the policies of the Bangladeshi state in the 
CHT, and its national tourism project which camouflages land expropriation and 
violence. 
In Chapter 1 of the thesis I outlined my research, its objectives, methods and the 
theoretical framework. In Chapter 2, I summarized the pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial trajectory which led to militarization in the Hills, where violence continues to be 
inflicted on the Jumma peoples. This trajectory is especially important to understand the 
present repression and subjugation of the Jumma. The state was able to mobilize support 
for its repression of the Jumma and militarization in the CHT by inciting nationalist 
fervor depicting the Jummas as a threat to Bengali-Muslim identity, a narrative that has 
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been internalized by many people. The current nationalist rhetoric has its history in post-
Parition nation-state building, where centralization emerged and justified as necessary to 
prevent further secession. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I presented the main findings 
drawn from my fieldwork and analysed them using scholars and anthropologists writing 
on the region. In Chapter 3 my fieldwork revealed the level of surveillance and control 
that is experienced in the Hills and how the same surveillance gives a sense of security to 
Bengali tourists but has a threatening meaning for the Jummas. Chapter 4 looks at the 
nature of military-based tourism in the Hills through the ethnographic work I conducted 
in Sajek, which has emerged as one of the most popular military-sponsored tourist 
destinations in the Hills since 2013. In this context, I describe and analyze two large-scale 
arson attacks in the region in 2008 and 2010 and their implications for the Jumma and 
tourism. I look at the structural and symbolic violence in the very nature of tourism in the 
area, where Jumma culture has been commodified for tourist consumption. This has been 
achieved largely by justifying and/or absenting the violent history in the region, and 
denying the rights of the Jummas. 
While British colonization, the Partition and colonial categorizations had a 
snowball effect on the relationship between the post-colonial states in South Asia and 
their minoritized communities, the political and economic interest of these centralized 
states and the overall shift to global capitalism has led to the exploitation of land and 
commodification of indigenous cultures. In the specific case of tourism in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts of Bangladesh the state has categorically denied the Jumma people the rights 
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to their identity and autonomy and followed a path of forced assimilation and co-optation 
in the field of tourism. While the Government of Bangladesh signed an Accord to resolve 
the conflict that led to two decades of military violence in the Hills, opposition to a 
hastily drafted Accord, failure to implement its most important clauses, and the Bengali-
Muslim chauvinism in dealing with the issues raised by the Jummas has led to the present 
paradoxical situation of tourism in the Hills. My scholarly contribution through this thesis 
has been to explore this paradox using an anthropological approach, in which fieldwork 
was key to illuminate how power is manifested, and by drawing on my previous 
experiences as activist in this field, and existing theoretical and ethnographic literature. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A (Acronyms) 
ADB   Asian Development Bank 
BA   Bangladesh Army 
BAL   Bangladesh Awami League 
BBS   Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
BNP   Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
CHT   Chittagong Hill Tracts 
CHTDB  Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board 
CHTIC Chittagong Hill Tracts Intelligence Committee  
DC   Deputy Commissioner 
DGFI   Directorate General of Forces Intelligence 
DSB  District Special Branch 
FB   Facebook 
HDC  Hill District Council 
PCJSS  Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity 
MOCHTA Ministry Of Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs 
NGO   Non-government organization 
NSI  National Security Intelligence 
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RC  Regional Council 
RIC  Regional Intelligence Committee 
SMF  Strategic Management Forum 
UNPFII United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues 
UPDF  United Peoples Democratic Front 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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Appendix B: Maps related to the research 
 
 
Map 1: Map of Bangladesh 
 
  
177 
 
 
Map 2: Map of Rangamati 
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Map 3: Map of Sajek. 
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Map 4: Google Earth view of Ruilui Para, Sajek. 
 
Map 5: Map of Ruilui Para, Sajek. Credit: Sanjib Debnath. 
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